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Preface 
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the same time, it has more modern features, in particular that it is not intended to be 
my magnum opus, but only intended to show proficiency in economic research on the 
basis of a couple of related articles. 
    This thesis is written using the first-person singular, thereby emphasizing that I 
take full responsibility for the final result. Nonetheless, many people have contributed 
directly or indirectly. First and foremost, I would like to pay tribute to my advisor 
Job Swank, who took over when Peter van Bergeijk left for Switzerland. It was both 
a privilege and a pleasure to work under Job’s guard. As Doktorvater, he has been a 
major inspirator for my research. Behind his stern face he hides both deep economic 
intuition and warm humanity. Special thanks are due to my father. He helped me to 
crack a couple of mathematical nuts during long hours together, be it in his study or 
in the family’s holiday-house in Langewiese. Jan Kakes, Gerben Hieminga and Jan 
Marc Berk & Bryan Chapple co-authored Chapters 4, 5 and 6, respectively. Martin 
Admiraal, René Bierdrager and Henk van Kerkhoff provided excellent statistical 
support. The contributions of co-authors and statisticians are gratefully 
acknowledged. 
    Combining writing a thesis and a regular job requires a supportive environment. I 
am indebted to my family, friends and colleagues, who have always encouraged me to 
proceed. 
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”I do not know what I may appear to the world, but to myself I seem to have been 
only like a boy playing on the sea-shore, and diverting myself in now and then 
finding a smoother pebble or a prettier shell than ordinary, whilst the great ocean of 
truth lay all undiscovered before me.” 
(Sir Isaac Newton) 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis is on monetary policy issues that come to the fore in an environment with
very low inflation.
Inflation has fallen world-wide since the 1980s. At the beginning of the 21st century,
price stability prevails in most OECD countries, meaning that overall consumer price
changes are anchored at a low level (ranging from around one half of a percent to 3 percent
per annum). This is a positive accomplishment. High and volatile inflation during the
1970s and 1980s showed that aggregate price hikes blur relative price changes, and that
transparency of relative price changes is indispensible for micro-economic efficiency. On
the macro scale, the high inflation environment led to strong cyclical fluctuations and
caused a redistribution of wealth from those who cannot insure against inflation to those
who can.
After many years of inflation reduction, some countries reached very low inflation
levels. A number of Asian countries have experienced deflation (negative inflation) in
the last fifteen years, Japan being the most prominent example. The recent example of
Japan, but also of the US in the 1930s, has shown that inflation can be too low: falling
prices lift real debt burdens, they tend to undermine demand and drive prices even lower.
Deflation or very low inflation may thwart the monetary policymaker’s ability to pursue
stabilization policies, since nominal interest rates cannot fall below zero. The zero floor
exists because negative interest rates would mean that borrowers pay back less than they
borrowed. For creditors, currency with a zero nominal return would offer a superior
alternative. Therefore, the supply of private sector credit is zero at negative interest
rates. The situation where interest rates cannot fall sufficiently to balance savings and
1
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investment at full employment, and where monetary stimuli are ineffective, was dubbed
the ’liquidity trap’ by John Maynard Keynes (1936). This phenomenon has long been
regarded as a theoretical curiosity. But the reduction of Japanese monetary policy interest
rates to the zero lower bound brought this issue to the forefront of the macroeconomic
debate. In Western economies, the zero lower bound can no longer be put aside as a
phenomenon of the remote past, since the US Federal reserve kept policy interest rates at
just 1% for about a year during 2003-2004. In addition, there was some fear of deflation
in the euro area in 1999.
Some observers have questioned whether the zero lower bound on nominal interest
rates exists in reality. Institutional arrangements have been suggested to remove the floor
to nominal interest rates. The most prominent example is the introduction of so-called
Gesell money, as discussed in Chapter 2. The circulation of Gesell money implies that
currency and its close substitutes (monetary liabilities on the central bank balance sheet)
are taxed, thereby removing the zero return investment opportunity that currency offers.
The practical obstacles to this solution are discussed in Chapter 2. An alternative way of
removing the lower bound on nominal interest rates has been suggested by Eisler (1932),
and more recently by Buiter (2007). The exchange function of money is separated from its
unit of account function. The central bank calls in all banknotes and coins denominated
in its currency (say euro), and introduces banknotes and coins in a new currency (say
new guilder) as the medium of exchange. It continues to pursue price stability in terms
of the euro and the central bank steers the exchange rate between the unit of account
(euro) and the medium of exchange (new guilder). The monetary policy interest rate on
euro bonds, which is no longer hindered by a lower bound since there is no zero interest
rate alternative, can be used to stabilise the purchasing power of the euro. Implementing
the dual currency proposal in practice seems to be difficult: people may start to use the
medium of exchange as a unit of account, and inflation in the unit of exchange currency
may fluctuate considerably. Taking these considerations into account, in this thesis the
zero lower bound is regarded as a restriction to nominal interest rates.
The research presented in this thesis is carried out in a so-called New Keynesian frame-
work, surveyed in Clarida et al. (1999) and Galí (2003). This strand of the literature adds
Keynesian elements such as nominal rigidities to a dynamic general equilibrium model in
the Real Business Cycle tradition. The equilibrium conditions are derived from optimiz-
3ing behaviour by forward-looking economic agents with rational expectations. The New
Keynesian framework is very useful for studying monetary policy issues, since it allows
for short-run deviations of actual output from potential output and a role for stabilization
policy, with the economy eventually moving towards the long-run classical equilibrium. It
reflects modern practice in that the interest rate is treated as the instrument of monetary
policy. The model accounts for the importance of expectations by incorporating many
forward-looking elements. Because of its explicit theoretical foundations, New Keynesian
models can be used for counterfactual policy experiments.
As with all approaches, the New Keynesian framework is not without limitations. In
particular, the assumption that firms face specific constraints on the frequency with which
they can reset their prices lacks a firm micro-economic basis. So-called Calvo pricing is a
simple way to introduce firms’ price setting behaviour, providing a straight-forward way
to model price stickiness. The Calvo parameter, which specifies the fraction of firms not
allowed to adjust prices in a certain period of time, is determined exogenously. It seems
likely that this parameter also depends on the inflation environment. In a climate with
extreme price changes (hyper inflation or spiralling deflation), the costs of changing prices
will be of less importance and firms will change prices more frequently (meaning a lower
Calvo parameter). However, the reduction of average inflation from about 2% to about
zero is unlikely to lead to strong changes in the Calvo parameter.
The standard New Keynesian setting also neglects financial frictions that may influence
the effect of changes in monetary policy interest rates on market interest rates. This thesis
accounts for financial frictions by focussing on the role of collateral. If economic prospects
improve, asset prices rise, implying higher collateral values and lower risk premiums for
collateralized loans. Chapter 3 discusses these issues in a theoretical framework, Chapter
4 from an empirical perspective. In addition, New Keynesian economists tend to pay
little attention to the role of monetary aggregates. However, the money supply can have
significant effects, depending on whether the economy is characterized by a high or low
inflation regime (Bordo and Filardo, 2006). These aspects are elaborated upon in Chapters
2 and 6. Apart from the inclusion of financial frictions and monetary aggregates, it was
a deliberate choice to use very stylized models for analyzing the issues at stake. These
models are not intended for forecasting, but are used to add to the understanding of
economic phenomena. This approach allows for a greater insight into the transmission
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channels in the economy than would the use of large-scale numerical models.
Chapter 2 defines the playing field. This survey chapter singles out the specific issues
for further research, which are dealt with in the subsequent chapters. It appears that
the issue of escaping from a binding zero lower bound has attracted much more attention
than how an economy slips into such a situation in the first place. An initial exploration
suggests that a collapse in macro-economic confidence plays a key role. Although it is
difficult to model overall confidence, it shows up in several financial factors, in particular
in macro-economic risk measures.
Chapter 3 developes a theoretical model to examine the key findings of Chapter 2.
Transmission channels that drive monetary policy towards the zero interest rate bound,
where further interest rate reductions are no longer possible, are investigated. The empha-
sis is on changes in market expectations of long-term potential growth that are reflected
in asset prices, and on how these financial factors can exacerbate real economic shocks
(the financial accelerator).
As is evident from Hubbard (1998), financial accelerator effects exist on a micro-
economic scale. In particular, investment decisions by small- and medium-sized firms
are influenced by their financial wealth. On the other hand, previous empirical research
on the importance of the financial accelerator for macro-economic outcomes has come
up with limited evidence. Against this background, Chapter 4 adds to the empirical
literature on financial accelerator effects on a macro-economic scale by focussing on the
large fluctuations in wealth that occur during asset price booms and busts. Using a probit
model for a panel of 20 mature economies, the explanatory power of several financial
variables is investigated.
Chapter 5 focuses on the relationship between the level of the inflation objective and
the risk of reaching a binding zero lower bound. Before the central bank can strive
for price stability, this concept must be operationalised. In particular, the level of the
year-on-year increase of the consumer price level (inflation) must be determined. Under
normal circumstances, actual inflation will hover around its target level. According to
Friedman, the optimal level of the nominal interest rate is (close to) zero, to equalise the
opportunity costs of holding money to the (negligible) costs of producing money. This
implies an optimal inflation level equal to minus the real interest rate, i.e. deflation. Most
New Keynesian economists have stressed the distortionary effects of (nominal) prices that
5only respond with lags to changes in economic conditions. In order to mitigate these
distortions they have argued in favour of a stable general price level, i.e. zero inflation.
However, if the zero lower bound poses a serious impedement to monetary policy by
limiting the downward room for manoeuvre of real interest rates, the optimal average
inflation level or inflation target is clearly above zero.
An increase in the money supply could still play a role in stimulating the economy when
the policy interest rate has reached the zero floor. Chapter 6 reports on the role of money
for monetary policy, and in particular on whether the monetary authority should take
money explicitly into account when setting monetary policy. To this end, the standard
New Keynesian model, with the interest rate as the monetary policy instrument instead
of the money supply, is extended with a micro-founded role for money in determining
aggregate demand and supply in order to better describe monetary policy transmission.
Two different channels can be distinguished. The first is the real balance channel, since
higher money stocks are associated with higher wealth, which will translate into higher
spending. The second channel concerns the role of money as an information variable.
Money captures information on the yields of other financial assets, since an increase in
money reduces risk premiums on less liquid assets.
Chapter 7 brings together concluding observations on the above-mentioned issues.
This thesis’ main contribution to the literature is that it shows analytically how a situation
can arise in which the monetary policy interest rate is zero, and can no longer be further
reduced to boost economic activity. It appears that a deterioration in economic prospects
not only reduces aggregate demand, but also hampers the loan market. This is because
economic prospects determine the valuation of assets that serve as collateral. A downward
shift in expectations and collateral value makes lending more risky, causing a rise in risk
premiums, which, along with the risk free rate set by the central bank, determine market
interest rates. In reaction, the central bank will have to reduce the policy interest rate
sharply to engineer a market interest rate at which aggregate demand equals aggregate
supply, restoring price stability. It is demonstrated that the patterns of monetary policy
interest rates in OECD countries have been largely consistent with this story from the
mid 1980s onwards, when financial markets were liberalized. Accordingly, there is a risk
that the policy interest rate can hit the zero floor in a low inflation regime. Nevertheless,
there may still be ways to relax monetary policy conditions when interest rates are zero,
6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
in particular by increasing the money supply. This thesis shows how monetary policy
is set optimally when interest rate risk premiums depend on the money supply through
wealth and financial market liquidity effects.
Finally, please note that symbols have slightly different meanings in different chapters.
Chapter 2
The zero lower bound issue: a survey
Representative Brown: ”...I think it would be interesting to Members of
Congress, and particularly to this Committee, to know what your policy would
be under present conditions...”
Fed governor Eccles: ”...Under present circumstances there is very little, if
anything, that can be done.”
Representative Goldsborough: ”You mean you cannot push a string.”
Fed governor Eccles: ”That is a good way to put it, one cannot push a string.
We are in the depths of a depression and, as I have said several times before
this committee, beyond creating an easy money situation through reduction of
discount rates and through the creation of excess reserves, there is litte, if any-
thing that the reserve organization can do toward bringing about recovery....”
(US Congress, 1935)
2.1 Introduction
In the 1980s and 1990s, inflation in the industrialised world fell from the high levels reached
in the 1970s and early 1980s, when inflation waves occurred following the breakdown of
the Bretton Woods system and two large oil price shocks.1 According to IMF statistics,
average year-on-year CPI inflation in OECD countries declined from 12% in 1980 to 5%
in 1990, and 1.4% in 1999 (Figure 2.1). The variability of inflation in terms of standard
1This chapter is a slightly revised version of Ullersma (2002).
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Figure 2.1: Consumer price inflation in advanced economies
deviations also decreased over these years. A new era seems to have emerged with low and
more or less stable inflation rates in the major capitalist economies (Clarida et al., 1998;
Viñals, 2001).2 This situation is comfortable from the point of view of monetary policy,
the overriding objective of which is price stability. In the words of Greenspan (1989), price
stability is defined to mean ‘that expected changes in the average price level are small
enough and gradual enough that they do not materially enter business and household
financial decisions.’
However, the achievement of price stability has not created a new Utopia for monetary
policy. Instead, it has brought about new challenges (e.g. IMF, 1999). One of the main
2In 1995, the leading monetary authorities of the world also expressed this view. At a meeting of the
Group of Seven in October 1995, the communiqué concluded: ‘The ministers and central bank governors
agreed that in most countries the conditions for continued growth and employment gains are in place and
inflation is well under control.’
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* German rates for the period until 1999. Thereafter: Eurosystem rates
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Figure 2.2: Monetary policy interest rates
challenges is the decrease in the room for manoeuvre for monetary policy.3,4 The fall in
the inflation rate in the advanced economies has coincided with a decline in the monetary
policy interest rates (Figure 2.2).5
The point is that — assuming zero storing costs for cash and perfect substitutability
between non-monetary assets — nominal interest rates cannot go negative. In that case,
the rate of return on cash (zero) dominates that on assets yielding a negative nominal
return. In practice, nominal interest rates on (short-term) financial claims can be slightly
negative if the cost of storing currency exceeds that of storing other claims (McCallum,
2000), although exceptions to the lower zero bound have been rare.6 Since for theoretical
3Vickrey (1954) argued against policies resulting in very low inflation or deflation. Deflation would
prevent monetary policy from engineering negative ex ante real interest rates, which can be necessary for
correcting downward tendencies in the economy.
4Another challenge is analysed by Akerlof et al. (1996). They have focussed on the existence of
downward rigidities that would favour the central bank having a small but positive inflation rate objective.
5For a historic account of (the volatility of) inflation and interest rates, see McFarlane and Mortimer-
Lee (1994) and Homer (1977), respectively.
6One recent example is the occurrence of slightly negative interest rates on Japanese short-term
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discussions the exact level of the floor to nominal interest rates does not matter, I assume
for simplicity that nominal interest rates cannot go negative. In this context, the so-called
problem of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is that the monetary authority
is no longer in a position to pursue a policy of monetary easing by lowering nominal
interest rates.7 Under these circumstances, monetary policy may still be effective via other
transmission channels than nominal interest rates. For instance, inflationary expectations
can be fuelled via higher money growth. I follow Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2001) in their
definition of a liquidity trap.8 An economy is said to be in a liquidity trap if all channels
of monetary transmission are blocked. Only in one case, the liquidity trap and the zero
bound on nominal interest rates are identical concepts. This applies if the nominal interest
is the only monetary transmission channel. In other cases, a binding zero lower bound is
a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the liquidity trap to prevail.
The zero lower bound on nominal interest rates has long been regarded as a phe-
nomenon of the past. It has been related mainly to the Great Depression in the US
(1929-1930s). The main monetary policy rate in the US by then, the three months ‘T-
bill’ rate, was close to zero from 1932 onwards; it did not exceed 1% until 1948. The
long-term interest rate was also very low in this period. It has been suggested that mon-
etary policy was completely ineffective by then, i.e. that a liquidity trap prevailed.9 The
only example of a binding zero lower bound in the period between the Great Depression
government bonds and some interbank lending in late 1998. Longer ago, in 1978, the Swiss authorities
imposed negative interest rates on foreign deposits in order to fight speculative buying of the Swiss
franc. During the Great Depression US T-bills occasionally gave a small negative yield in the context of
exemption from personal property taxes in some States (Cecchetti, 1988).
7 In such circumstances, monetary easing is said to be like ‘pushing on a string’, see this chapter’s
motto.
8In between these extreme positions on the interpretation of a liquidity trap, there exists a large range
of slightly different interpretations of the liquidity trap. Since they all share common features, these
differences are of limited importance to our discussion of the liquidity trap. For a detailed discussion of
different interpretations, see Patinkin (1965, 1974) and Beranek and Timberlake (1987).
9 In the 1960s and 1970s, there was an intensive, but inconclusive, debate on whether the US economy
was in a liquidity trap during the years of the Great Depression. This debate focussed on the interest
elasticity of the money demand function. Some authors found that the interest elasticity was without limit
when the short-term nominal interest rate approached zero. Therefore, they concluded that the economy
was in a liquidity trap (Eisner, 1963, 1971; Spitzer, 1976); others found a fixed interest elasticity and
came to the opposite conclusion (Bronfenbrenner and Mayer, 1960, 1963; Meltzer, 1963).
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and the 1990s is Switzerland. In the late 1970s, Switzerland went through periods with
nominal interest rates at or close to the zero lower bound. However, in contrast to the
US during the Depression years, the Swiss economy was buoyant in the late 1970s. The
very low Swiss rates have been associated with the liberalisation of global exchange rates
in the early 1970s, although the introduction by the Swiss authorities of capital controls
also played a role (Mauro, 1995). The new exchange rate regime implied appreciation and
expectations of further appreciation of the Swiss franc.
Developments in Japan in the late 1990s have revived interest in the zero lower bound
phenomenon. From February 1999 to January 2002 completion of this paper , the un-
collateralized overnight call rate was virtually zero.10 Like the US economy during the
Depression years, Japan has been characterised by a substantial output gap since the
early 1990s.11 The level of potential real economic growth is estimated to be around 1%
(OECD, 2000). Given that potential growth in other large economies is generally esti-
mated to be considerably higher,12 it follows that even in steady state (i.e. output gap
closed) the Japanese real longterm interest rate will be relatively low. Assuming identical
risk and term premiums across countries, this will go hand in hand with relatively low
short-term nominal interest rates. The Japanese example illustrates that a zero lower
bound can emerge in a modern capitalist economy. Krugman (1998, 1999b) and Svensson
(2000) have warned explicitly that such a situation might also prevail in the US and the
euro area, given the structural decline in nominal interest rates over the last two decades.
This chapter surveys the literature on the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates
and the related phenomenon of the liquidity trap. Section 2 sketches the main issues in
the framework of a New-Keynesian model, which is a dynamic stochastic real business
cycle model with nominal rigidities. Section 3 offers an appraisal of the four main strands
in the literature. As it turns out, these theories are incomplete. In the concluding Section
4, I argue that certain crucial insights got lost in the literature. This pertains in partic-
10Until March 19, 2001, the uncollateralized overnight call rate was the direct operational target of
the Bank of Japan. From then onward, the operational target has been the outstanding balance of the
current accounts at the Bank of Japan, with the uncollateralized overnight call rate determined in the
market.
11According to the OECD (2000), Japan’s output gap in 1999 is 4.0% of GDP. Applying Okun’s law,
Krugman (1998) concludes that Japan’s output gap is even higher, in the order of 10%.
12The OECD (2000) projects potential real growth in 2000 at 1.2% in Japan, 3.7% in the US, and 2.4%
in the euro area.
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ular to expectations, which were totally left out in the static ISLM representation of a
macroeconomy by Hicks (1937) to return only partly in later work. It appears that supply
factors that undermine confidence are depressing total demand in a situation with a bind-
ing zero lower bound. Hence, a lack of confidence is the main force driving the emergence
of a liquidity trap; similarly, restoring confidence is the main challenge in escaping from
it.
2.2 The consensus model
The zero lower bound on nominal rates was recognised as early as 1896 by Irving Fisher
(1896). However, Keynes (1936) was the first to elaborate on the problem of the liquidity
trap13 in Chapters 15 and 17 of The General Theory (see also Lerner, 1952, and Ono,
1994). He emphasises the liquidity preference of economic agents, implying that the
utility of holding money is always positive, even if more money is held than required by
the transactions or precautionary motive (compare Modigliani, 1944). Keynes shows that
a liquidity trap can emerge in an environment with liquidity preference and sluggish
price adjustment. The basic idea is that an economic agent allocates his income to
consumption, money holdings and bonds, assuming that all assets other than money
are perfect substitutes for each other. Under normal circumstances, optimising behaviour
will equalise the marginal rate of substitution between present and future consumption
((intertemporal) time preference rate), the marginal rate between present consumption
and present money holdings (liquidity premium), and the nominal market interest rate.
However, if the nominal market interest rate is below the liquidity premium, economic
agents will keep consumption below the market clearing level. Persistent stagnation will
occur, because economic agents will not be satiated with money, no matter how much they
have accumulated. Liquidity preference prevails because of the speculative motive, based
on uncertainty about future economic developments in general, and more specifically,
13The liquidity trap as described by Keynes differs from the usual textbook description. The latter is
based on Hicks’ (1937) representation of a Keynesian economy in the famous ISLM framework. Hicks left
out the intertemporal choice completely and put the economy in a static framework, thereby focussing
on intratemporal choices that are key in Keynes (1936). In a one-period model, there is no role to play
for a change in expectations. Hicks was well aware of the limitations of his simplification. He himself
noted that the assumption of given expectations is not realistic.
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about future nominal interest rates. If the long-term nominal interest rate is perceived to
be very low (in the order of 2% according to Keynes, 1936), economic agents will expect
this rate to rise and will hold liquid assets (money) in an attempt to benefit from it. In
Keynes’ (1936) view, the role of money as a store of wealth is the reason that ‘changing
views about the future are capable of influencing the present situation.’ With the market
interest rate below the liquidity premium, consumption remains insufficient to restore
market equilibrium, and money becomes a ‘bottomless sink for purchasing power.’ The
economy is then said to be in a liquidity trap. In Keynes’ (1936, page 207) own words:
‘There is the possibility [...] that, after the rate of interest has fallen to a
certain level, liquidity preference may become virtually absolute in the sense
that almost everyone prefers cash to holding a debt which yields so low a rate
of interest. In this event the monetary authority would have lost effective
control over the rate of interest.’
The classical economist Pigou (1943, 1947) disagreed with Keynes on this conclu-
sion. In his view, the utility of money is satiable, meaning that ultimately the liquidity
premium will decline sufficiently to reach the time preference rate when liquidity hold-
ings increase.14 In this view, rational economic agents will ultimately spend their cash
holdings. The basic idea behind the mechanism that will restore equilibrium is the follow-
ing. Economic agents realise that monetary growth will ultimately imply higher inflation
(Fisher identity) and that future inflation will reduce their spending capacity. Hence, they
have a strong incentive — at least in the long run — to spend before others do. If the time
preference rate at the market clearing level is lower than the liquidity premium, economic
agents will reduce consumption. This will imply disequilibrium in the goods market, and
therefore generate deflation. As a result, real balances will rise over time, which will raise
consumption until equilibrium is restored. This is the so-called Pigou effect.
Now, a consensus model has emerged to study the zero lower bound. In the long run,
market clearing and the Pigou effect are generally believed to restore full employment
equilibrium. Ultimately, there are no nominal rigidities and money is neutral. Hence,
monetary policy has no real economic effects in the long run, and a liquidity trap is
inconceivable as a persistent phenomenon. As regards the short-run analysis of the zero
14Compare McCallum (1983) for a formal analysis.
14 CHAPTER 2. THE ZERO LOWER BOUND ISSUE: A SURVEY
lower bound, different approaches have culminated in the New-Keynesian synthesis,15
which can be regarded as a symbiosis of neo-classical and Keynesian thoughts. New-
Keynesian models introduce nominal price and/or wage rigidities in a dynamic stochastic
real business cycle framework. It took a long time until serious consideration was given to
the zero lower bound for nominal interest rates in this framework. Summers (1991) and
Fischer (1994) have revived this old concern. Since then, Fuhrer and Madigan (1997),
Krugman (1998), Orphanides and Wieland (1998), Svensson (2000, 2001), Buiter and
Panigirtzoglou (2001), and Wolman (1998) have studied the zero lower bound and the
liquidity trap in a New-Keynesian framework. Although this framework has important
limitations when analysing the zero lower bound, it has proven to be a helpful workhorse
to study certain aspects of this issue. I take it as a starting point and discuss its limitations
and possible extensions along the way. Following Smets (2003) and Viñals (2001), a highly
stylised New-Keynesian macroeconomic model can be specified as follows (equations 2.1-
2.4):
yt = ρyyt−1 +
(
1− ρy
)
Etyt+1 − σrt + εyt , (2.1)
πt = ωπt−1 + (1− ω)Etπt+1 + λyt + επt , (2.2)
rt = it −Etπt+1, (2.3)
it = ρrit−1 + βππt + βyyt. (2.4)
yt (in logs) is the percentage deviation of output from its steady state trend level in period
t, it the nominal interest rate, tt the ex ante real interest rate, and πt the inflation rate.
εyt and ε
π
t are the (serially uncorrelated zero-mean) stochastic components of equations
2.1 and 2.2, representing demand and inflation disturbances, respectively. Etxt+1 is the
expected value at period t of variable x in period t + 1; ρy, σ, ω and λ are parameters.
Equation 2.1 is a representation of the demand side of the economy. Equation 2.2 is a
Phillips curve, representing the supply side. With ρy and ω equal to zero, Goodfriend
and King (1997) have demonstrated that these equations can be derived from micro
foundations. However, equations 2.1 and 2.2 consist of both forward and backward looking
components in order to describe the inflation dynamics in industrialised economies better
(Smets, 2003). Equation 2.3 describes the Fisher relation between (ex ante) real and
15The New-Keynesian literature is surveyed in Goodfriend and King (1997) and Clarida et al. (1999).
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nominal interest rates. By definition, the zero lower bound is binding when the sum of the
real rate of interest and the rate of expected inflation is zero. Nominal interest rates cannot
go negative. For in that case, the zero rate of return on cash would dominate the rate of
return on other assets, which is ruled out a priori. The model does not distinguish between
short- and long-term interest rates.16 Perfect substitutability is assumed between non-
monetary assets. Finally, equation 2.4 is the Taylor type rule that describes the interest
rate reaction function. The nominal interest rate is increased when current inflation
exceeds its target (assumed to be zero) or when the output gap is positive. Equation
2.4 may require that the monetary authority set a negative real interest rate, which may
be impeded by low or even negative expected rates of inflation. Then, the zero lower
bound will be binding, and the economy will be in a liquidity trap in the absence of other
transmission mechanisms than the nominal interest rate.
An economy with a low average real interest rate over the business cycle is in a more
vulnerable position concerning the risk of drifting into a situation with a binding zero
lower bound than an economy with a higher average real interest rate. Usually, however,
an economic shock is necessary to trigger a sudden decline in the steady state real interest
rates and/or the rate of expected inflation (e.g. Orphanides and Wieland, 1998). I discuss
several kinds of shocks that can hit the economy.
First, a downward cost-push shock can trigger a binding zero lower bound. Examples
are a downward shock in oil prices or increased competition. Such a shock implies a
significant negative value of επt in equation 2.2. The direct effect is lower inflation in
period t. As a result, the nominal interest rate will be decreased (equation 2.4), moving
in the direction of the zero lower bound. The ex ante real interest rate will decrease
too, causing some counterbalancing upward pressure on inflation through yt. In general,
a downward cost-push shock is favourable, supporting output but reducing inflationary
pressures.17 Only if there is very strong initial downward pressure on inflation, there is a
16For ease of exposition, the model ignores term and risk premiums. The incorporation of risk premiums
would add a spread to the interest rate in equation 2.1, and would lift the lower bound to the nominal
interest rate. In general, risk premiums are increasing with the level of interest rates. If there would still
be a risk premium with the riskless nominal interest rate at its lower bound — which seems likely — the
incorporation of risk premiums in the model would make a binding lower bound more likely.
17E.g. continued price cuts in the computer industry in the 1980s and 1990s associated with technical
progress have not undermined investment in this sector, because productivity gains have more than offset
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severe risk that the zero lower bound will be hit.
Second, a downward demand shock, εyt < 0 in equation 2.1, putting downward pressure
on both output and inflation, can cause a binding zero lower bound. The output gap will
fall first (equation 2.1), resulting in lower inflation in the same period (equation 2.2).
Both effects are translated into a lower nominal interest rate (equation 2.4), bringing
closer a binding zero lower bound. A demand shock may originate from a collapse in
aggregate demand, e.g. following a sudden lack of confidence. Contrary to the situation
after a downward supply shock, both the output gap and inflation pressure have similar
effects on the nominal interest rate. Therefore, this is potentially a more severe situation.
Budgetary contraction offers an example of a negative demand shock that lowers real
interest rates and can fuel deflationary expectations, as was the case in the US in the late
1920s/early 1930s.
Third, in an open economy, a sudden large expected appreciation can cause a binding
zero lower bound (McKinnon and Ohno, 2000). To illustrate this, the model can be
extended to include interactions with the outside world. I assume Uncovered Interest
Parity (UIP), which can be stated as:
it = i
∗
t + (Etst+1 − st) , (2.5)
where i∗t is the foreign nominal rate of interest. Etst+1 is the expected nominal exchange
rate of the foreign currency expressed in units of the domestic currency for period t + 1.
So, an increase in s means a nominal depreciation of the domestic currency. In real terms,
UIP can be written as:
rt = r
∗
t + (Etqt+1 − qt) , (2.6)
where q is the real exchange rate (stP ∗t /Pt), the domestic price level P is assumed to
be temporarily fixed; the foreign price level P ∗ is treated as given, because it is beyond
the influence of the domestic monetary authority. The central bank can influence q via
foreign currency interventions that alter s. I restate the model (equations 2.1-2.4) in an
open economy context as follows (equations 2.7-2.10):
the price effect. Other sectors of the economy have clearly benefited from lower computer prices.
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yt = ρyyt−1 + ρ
∗
yy
∗
t +
(
1− ρy
)
Etyt+1 − σrt + α1 (Etqt+1 − qt) + εyt , (2.7)
πt = ωπt−1 + (1− ω)Etπt+1 + λyt + α2 (Etqt+1 − qt) + επt , (2.8)
rt = it − Etπt+1 = r∗t (Etqt+1 − qt) , (2.9)
it = ρrit−1 + βππt + βyyt. (2.10)
ρ∗y, α1 and α2 are parameters. In equation 2.7, ρ
∗
yy
∗
t represents foreign export demand
18;
α1 (Etqt+1 − qt) is an expression for changes in competitiveness. In equation 2.8 the term
α2 (Etqt+1 − qt) is added to include the effects of expected costs of imported intermediaries.
Equation 2.9 follows from equation 2.6. With a large expected real appreciation, the direct
effect on the inflation rate will be downward (equation 2.8),19 bringing closer a binding
zero lower bound (equation 2.10). There is also an indirect downward effect on inflation
via a lower output gap (equation 2.7). Exchange rate arrangements that cause substantial
real appreciation can turn out to be problematic in this respect. Keynes (1923) was well
aware of the international propagation of deflationary pressures through the fixed nominal
exchange rates of the gold standard, which limited the scope for domestic policy actions
in an international environment with free capital movement (incompatible triangle). In
the 1980s, the Plaza and Louvre agreements set similar mechanisms in motion, with
negative effects on Japan (Siebert, 2000). The international movement towards stable
and low inflation rates (Section 1) has reduced the risk of the emergence of a sudden large
expected appreciation in today’s advanced economies.
Economic shocks are most devastating when they lead to persistent deflationary ex-
pectations, lifting real interest rates, and set in motion a chain of events that lead to
stagnation, i.e. a deflationary spiral (Krugman, 1999a). Persistent deflationary expec-
tations can stem from prevailing adaptive expectations (high value of ω in the model).
They can also stem from price and/or wage stickiness (e.g. DeLong and Summers, 1986).
The implied slowness of price reductions can fuel (rational) expectations of still further
18In an open economy, net additional demand via net exports reduces the risk of very low ex ante real
interest rates.
19 In the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS (fixed but adjustable exchange rates), higher
inflation of an ERM country relative to inflation in Germany (the anchor country) caused a loss of
competitiveness (real appreciation), mitigating inflationary pressures.
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price reductions (Etπt+1 lower). Fisher20 (1933), Tobin (1975, 1980), Minsky (1982), King
(1994), and Bernanke (1995) have emphasised that high nominal indebtedness will make
a deflationary spiral more likely to occur due to the heterogeneous nature of economic
agents. More specifically, debtors, who spend a higher proportion of their income than
creditors, get into trouble by deflation since their real income declines substantially. So,
even if net debt is modest (with debtors and creditors offsetting each other), debt dis-
tribution is relevant. High nominal indebtedness can arise during an asset price bubble
(Minsky, 1982; Wolfson, 1996). When the bubble collapses, the debt may turn out to be
unbearable, especially in a deflationary climate. An alternative propagation mechanism
concerns the collateral value associated with the debt. Deflation will erode the collateral
value. As a result the cost of capital will increase, subsequently decreasing investment de-
mand (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). A vicious circle can develop, with falling asset prices,
rising real debt levels, lower aggregate demand, consumer price deflation, and downward
spiralling expectations. Note that a deflationary spiral is not the mirror image of an in-
flationary spiral. In the latter case, the monetary authority can stabilise the economy by
raising the real rate of interest via an increase in nominal rates (assuming nominal price
and/or wage rigidities). However, in a deflationary environment, the monetary author-
ity will not be able to lower real rates below a certain level, due to the lower bound on
nominal interest rates.
Usually, the risk of a binding zero lower bound is regarded as limited. According to
Orphanides and Wieland (1998), the risk of hitting the zero bound would be negligible
for the US with an average nominal interest rate over the cycle of 3%. To get this result,
they use stochastic simulations of a small structural rational expectations model. They
suppose stochastic shocks similar in magnitude to those over the 1980s and 1990s. Only
with a lower level of the average nominal interest rate, they found a significant risk of
a binding zero bound. Using a similar model, Viñals (2001) has compared the US and
the euro area chance of hitting the zero lower bound. His findings for the US are more
or less in line with those of Orphanides and Wieland (1998). For the euro area, his
results suggest an even smaller chance than for the US of hitting the zero lower bound
due to the structural characteristics of the euro area. However, finding that shocks that
cause a binding zero lower bound are unlikely, does not rule them out altogether. The
20Fisher’s debt-deflation theory is clearly analysed in Dimand (1999).
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probability of a binding zero lower bound depends on the likelihood of a combination of
extreme shocks. Since the frequency of such shocks is limited, they are hard to assess
econometrically (King, 1999).21 Typically, in a financial crisis, several different shocks
can reinforce themselves. Mishkin (1991, 1996) defines a financial crisis as ‘a disruption
to financial markets that sharply and severely increases asymmetric information [...] so
that financial markets are no longer able to efficiently channel funds to those who have
the most productive investment opportunities.’ He has found that most financial crises in
the US started with a combination of shocks, including a sharp increase in interest rates,
a stock market crash, and a sharp increase in uncertainty due to economic recession. In
addition, the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001 offer
an example of a rare combination of shocks. Lower demand as a result of the virtual
stand-still of the US economy for several days, falling asset prices, together with strong
negative confidence effects, can potentially trigger a binding zero lower bound.
2.3 Different views on the zero lower bound: an ap-
praisal
Four main strands of literature can be distinguished to discuss the zero lower bound.
First, Krugman and his followers have emphasised the importance of lifting expected in-
flation to lower the market real interest rate at the zero lower bound. Second, Meltzer
and other monetarist authors have argued that transmission mechanisms other than the
nominal interest rate will be effective at the zero lower bound. Third, Buiter and Pani-
girtzoglou as well as Goodfriend have proposed to introduced so-called Gesell money. As
explained by Goodfriend (2000), Gesell money is a carry tax on money (both currency
and bank reserves) to circumvent the interest rate floor. Fourth, Svensson has tried to
combine several other approaches, and claims to have found a ‘foolproof’ way to escape
from the liquidity trap. These different approaches are discussed below in the context of
the consensus model. Meanwhile, it is important to keep in mind that Japan has been
21Amirault and O’Reilly (2001) warn that relying on historical data to determine the risk of hitting
the zero lower bound may underestimate this risk due to the recent world-wide tendency towards regimes
with low average levels of inflation.
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struggling for many years with a binding zero lower bound. This may indicate that the
theories put forward are incomplete, although it is fair to say that this proposition does
not follow from the Japanese example per se, as a referee has correctly pointed out. From
the perspective that the available theories seem incomplete, this section also evaluates the
limitations of the main strands in the literature.
2.3.1 Krugman’s view
Several years before Krugman (1998), Summers (1991) had emphasised that a (very)
low level of average inflation and low inflationary expectations will imply (very) low
average short-term nominal interest rates. If the monetary strategy leads to inflationary
expectations close to or below zero, this will make the emergence of a binding zero lower
bound more likely. Krugman (1998) has triggered a discussion on Japanese monetary
policies. In his analysis, lifting expected inflation is the way forward for Japan and other
economies struggling with a binding zero lower bound. He makes a strong case for the
announcement of an inflation target in a deflationary environment in order to guard
inflationary expectations. Then, lifting expected inflation (equation 2.3) can reduce the
ex ante real interest rate, which is the interest rate decisive for economic performance
(equation 2.1).
According to, among others, Svensson (2000) and Smets (2003), price level targeting
might be a better way to anchor expectations than an inflation target. This is because, in
contrast to an inflation targeting regime, undershooting of the price level target in period
t leads to inflationary expectations in period t+1. Berg and Jonung (1999) describe how
Sweden dropped the gold standard in 1931 and adopted an explicit price level target. It
turned out that price level targeting was a successful way for Sweden to stop deflationary
expectations and mitigate the output decline. The potentially better performance of price
level targeting as compared to inflation targeting is subject to the confidence of the general
public and financial markets in the monetary authority’s ability to reflate the economy.22
In this respect, the public can be expected to be more confident if the central bank has
at its disposal instruments with which it can create future inflation directly.
In addition to the long turn orientation of monetary policy, monetary tactics (i.e.
22Batani and Yates (2003) have shown that the probability of hitting the zero lower bound under the
alternative regimes is model specific.
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the way in which monetary policy is executed on a short-term basis) may also matter.
Reifschneider and Williams (2000) have argued that if the central bank follows a Taylor-
type rule and targets a (close to) zero inflation rate, the rule can be modified slightly
to reduce dramatically the detrimental effects of the zero lower bound. In their paper,
one possible modification with promising results is to lower the nominal monetary policy
rate pre-emptively if a binding zero bound is expected. This would involve a higher value
for βπ in equation 2.4 if there were a serious threat of a binding zero bound in the near
future. The suggested policy reaction is in line with what several authors (e.g. Mundell,
2000) have concluded on Fed policies in the late 1920s. With hindsight, they have stated
that the Fed should have lowered nominal interest rates sooner and more forcefully and
should have injected reserves via its lender-of-last-resort function. Then, the Fed might
have been in a position to prevent the rapid decline in broad money and the collapse
of the banking sector. The deflation of the Great Depression would probably have been
more modest, or even avoided.
Krugman launched his ideas in order to influence Japanese policies at the end of the
1990s. The Japanese authorities and others have been very sceptical about his recipes. In
their view, the Bank of Japan cannot explicitly show how to achieve the desired inflation
level. They fear following Krugman’s advice would result in a loss of credibility (Okina,
1999). Whereas Krugman acknowledges that creating inflationary expectations might
be difficult, especially when the public is convinced of the central bank’s commitment
to price stability, Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2001) regard this virtually impossible. In
their words ‘targeting a higher rate of inflation after you are caught in the trap would
be like pushing toothpaste back into the tube.’ The problem is that Krugman’s recipe is
conditional on the central bank’s ability to increase expected inflation.23 In reality, the
central bank has no instruments available to force higher expected inflation. It might
also be difficult to raise inflationary expectations because price stickiness can make the
expected future price also sticky (Fuhrer and Madigan, 1997; Orphanides and Wieland,
1998). Krugman’s ideas fit in the literature on time inconsistency and credibility by
Kydland and Prescott (1977), Barro and Gordon (1983) and their followers that credible
23Wolman (1998) models an economy in which the monetary authority can always create inflationary
expectations. Not surprisingly, in this case a policy regime where nominal interest rates are occasionally
bounded by the interest rate floor generates higher welfare than a regime that always avoids nominal
rates at zero.
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central bank commitment to price stability can anchor expected inflation at a low and
stable level. If his recipe works, it is important to avoid that creating higher inflationary
expectations paves the way for a future inflationary spiral, which would be suboptimal
from a microeconomic perspective. Therefore, it is crucial to base monetary policies on a
nominal anchor provided by the medium term monetary policy strategy (Taylor, 2001).
In so doing, the monetary policy strategy helps in reducing uncertainty about the future.
Similarly, Svensson (2000) argues that the mere announcement of an inflation target is not
likely to be enough to fuel inflationary expectations. Instead, it would be necessary to set
up an inflation-targeting framework, including transparent inflation reports and published
inflation forecasts among other things. In the words of Blinder (1998), it is about ‘words
matching deeds.’ All in all, it seems unlikely that the exact set-up of the monetary policy
strategy is essential for its success in solving the zero lower bound problem. What matters,
is that it helps anchoring medium term inflationary expectations. But if a central bank
is initially lacking credibility, it is unlikely that it is able to commit credibly to higher
inflation.
2.3.2 Meltzer’s monetarist view
Monetarists argue that the monetary transmission channel24 is much more complicated
than is incorporated in equation 2.1. The monetarist view differs from the consensus
model in so far that monetary easing will still be successful with short-term interest rates
at the lower bound because of other transmission channels (e.g. Mishkin, 1996). Meltzer
(1963, 1995, 1999) and Brunner and Meltzer (1968) focus on the transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy working through relative price adjustments of non-monetary assets
that are imperfect substitutes in investors’ portfolios. These relative price changes are
transmitted along the yield curve and also impact on the exchange rate.25 Meltzer’s
reasoning is based on the assumption that when the short-term nominal interest rate
cannot fall due to the zero lower bound, yields on non-monetary assets are not necessarily
24Walsh (2003) presents a useful overview of monetary transmission channels and empirical evidence
of their importance in Chapter 7.
25 In this chapter, the monetary policy channel that works through foreign exchange markets is discussed
in the context of Svensson’s eclectic view.
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at their lower bounds.26 Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have emphasised the credit channel
in the monetary policy transmission process. This channel is not hampered by the lower
zero bound on nominal interest rates. Monetary easing will reduce the exposure by debtors
to the wedge between the cost of external and internal funds. This will support current
spending.
The Pigou effect can be seen as an abstraction of ‘alternative’ transmission channels
that do not work through the nominal interest rate. To see this, the model 2.1-2.4 can be
extended as follows (equations 2.11-2.15):
yt = ρyyt−1 +
(
1− ρy
)
Etyt+1 − σrt + ρy,mmt + εyt , (2.11)
πt = ωπt−1 + (1− ω)Etπt+1 + λyt + ωmmt + επt , (2.12)
rt = it −Etπt+1, (2.13)
it = ρrit−1 + βππt + βyyt, (2.14)
mt = γ0 + γ1yt + γ2it + ε
m
t , (2.15)
where mt (in logs) is the percentage deviation from the steady state of the nominal value
of the real money demand (i.e. nominal amount of money divided by the price level,
Mt/Pt); γ0, γ1 and γ2 are coefficients; ε
m
t is an error term. The parameters ρy,m and ωm
have been added. The Pigou effect is incorporated in equation 2.11 through mt. With
output below potential, real balances will increase until the price level and output are
back in equilibrium. Ireland (2004) has shown that the cross-equation restrictions require
that real balances can be included in the demand function if and only if they are also
contained in the supply function. As before, there is only one instrument variable. It is
useful to regard mt as the instrument variable, since lifting the real amount of money can
boost output and inflation, even if the nominal interest rate is at the zero lower bound.
Does it make sense to add the Pigou effect to the short-term consensus model? At
first sight, the Pigou effect seems at odds with the micro foundations of the consensus
26In practice, monetary easing with the short-term interest rate at the zero lower bound might involve
additional open-market transactions in other assets, such as commercial paper. Since late 1995, the Bank
of Japan is implementing repurchasing agreements using commercial paper. In 1998, the Bank of Japan
held approximately one-third of the outstanding commercial paper stock. Transactions in longer-term
debt, equity or property are also conceivable.
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model, which is a representative agent model. Money is not perceived as net wealth in
this kind of model, since wealth cannot be transferred across individuals. However, if
the assumption of homogenous agents is relaxed, for instance by differentiating between
different generations, money becomes net wealth Ireland (2001b). In the monetarist
approach, the Pigou or real balance effect is incorporated in a short-run model. This
is done to emphasise the role of monetary factors in the monetary policy transmission
process.
From a theoretical point of view, the monetarist assertion that monetary transmission
channels other than via nominal interest rates can prevent a liquidity trap is conditional on
the assumption that the marginal utility of money eventually becomes zero as real balances
expand.27 However, if liquidity preference as defined in section 2 is assumed, the demand
for money will asymptote to infinity as the interest rate asymptotes to zero. On mature
financial markets, this can be thought of as a high preference by market participants
for liquid assets. Monetary policy would then have no effect on total demand, because
hoarding would absorb any additional money created. Money then becomes ‘a bottomless
sink for purchasing power.’ The consensus model takes on board liquidity preference in
so far that there is no explicit Pigou effect.
From a more practical point of view, an important caveat concerning alternative mon-
etary transmission mechanisms in a zero lower bound environment is that empirical ev-
idence on the effectiveness of these channels in such a context is lacking. For instance,
Clouse et al. (2003) have investigated which theoretical options are available for the Fed
to stimulate aggregate demand by increasing monetary supply after the short-term in-
terest rate has reached zero. They concluded that the Fed has a wide range of policy
responses at its disposal, but they did not find convincing evidence of substantial quanti-
tative effects. The most farreaching policy option along these lines is allowing companies
and individuals lending directly from the central bank on a massive scale. However, if the
central bank is purchasing lower rated private sector securities, it will take substantial
credit risks on its balance sheet. This can backfire on its credibility. Because of this risk,
central bank legislation usually rules out these kinds of transactions.
27Preferences for money balances would then exhibit satiation and money creation would ultimately
be translated in demand for other assets and spending.
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2.3.3 Buiter’s and Goodfriend’s view: abolition of the zero bound
Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2001) and Goodfriend (2000) have suggested the introduction
of so-called Gesell money.28 This would imply decreasing the zero nominal interest floor
by taxing money (and other monetary liabilities on the central bank balance sheet). In
terms of our model, the restriction that nominal interest rates cannot go negative is
circumvented. With Gesell money it will always be possible to reduce the interest rate
floor, even below zero.
The possible success of Gesell money is conditional on the availability of technologies
that make it feasible without high costs. This is questionable in practice. The introduction
of Gesell money will bring about high transaction and administrative costs, reducing its
liquidity and thereby the main advantage of money (see Brunner, 1971). Moreover, the
replacement of conventional money by Gesell money would make currency less attractive
as compared to today’s alternatives, such as foreign currency and e-money, assuming that
e-money is not subject to the same tax (Gresham’s law). This could impair the central
banks monetary policy effectiveness, as explained by Friedman (1999).
2.3.4 Svensson’s view: an important role for exchange rate poli-
cies
In line with monetarist reasoning about different transmission channels of monetary policy,
some authors have stressed the exchange rate channel in a zero lower bound situation.
A medium-term strategy to devaluate/depreciate the currency (an increase in Etst+1 in
the model embodied in equations 2.7-2.10) can increase inflationary expectations. This
strategy is only applicable to relatively open economies. It is assumed that the targeted
country is not in a zero lower bound situation. Johnson et al. (1999) show that — assuming
UIP holds — foreign exchange interventions at the lower bound can only have direct effects
if they signal further future depreciation, or if domestic and foreign assets are imperfect
substitutes. Both channels can be expected to be of minor importance, as is well known
from the literature on foreign exchange intervention (Edison, 1993; Eijffinger, 1999).
McCallum (2000) drops the UIP assumption explicitly.29 In his model, the exchange
28Fisher (1932) and Keynes (1936) have hinted at this idea in the 1930s.
29Empirical research tends to suggest that exchange rate movements are inconsistent with UIP (e.g.
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rate replaces the short-term nominal interest rate as the monetary policy instrument. The
central bank can determine real exchange rates via its control over nominal exchange rates,
as is the case in our model (2.7-2.10). In the absence of UIP, McCallum is able to show
that monetary stabilisation policy can still be effective via foreign exchange markets.30
In line with McCallum (2000), McKinnon and Ohno (2000) argue that if deflation is
caused by expectations of appreciation of the domestic currency, the forward rate of the
exchange rate should be brought down, e.g. by international exchange rate agreements.
Elaborating on these ideas, Svensson (2000, 2001) indicates that exchange rate pegging,
involving a commitment to arbitrary large non-sterilised foreign exchange interventions,
might play an important role. Since this strategy would involve putting into circulation
domestic currency and buying foreign reserves, the central bank cannot run out of reserves.
He drops UIP for his short-term analysis by assuming a sticky domestic price level, so
that the real exchange rate can be influenced in the short run. In Svensson (2001), he
has presented a very transparent model to explain his ideas. He claims to have found a
‘foolproof’ way for an open economy to escape from the binding zero lower bound. The
idea is to jump-start the economy by a real depreciation of the currency via unlimited
interventions, and in so doing to increase inflationary expectations. Initially, an exchange
rate peg is established, which is later replaced by a price-level or inflation target when
the price-level target has been reached. In so doing the risk of overheating is avoided.
A problem with Svensson’s ‘foolproof’ solution is that the expected real exchange
rate depreciation in the initial phase will raise real interest rates with limited maturities
relative to world real interest rates (Swank, 2001). This will counteract the exchange
rate mechanism. If the real interest mechanism dominates, the inflation rate will not
rise initially. A persistent low or negative inflation rate can undermine the credibility of
the monetary authority and puts at risk the strategy as a whole. A practical problem
is that the central bank cannot steer the exchange rate as it can steer interest rates. In
the specific Japanese context, a problem is the relatively closed nature of the Japanese
Froot and Thaler, 1990; Lewis, 1995).
30Meltzer (1999) is of the same opinion, stating ‘Suppose that with its short-term interest rate at zero,
the Bank of Japan announces that it wants the dollar exchange rate to fall by 25 percent and that it is
prepared to print yen to buy dollars until that occurs. Does anyone doubt that the yen would depreciate
or that the depreciation would affect spending, output and prices in Japan?’ McCallum’s arguments can
be interpreted as a special case in Meltzer’s rejection of the liquidity trap framework.
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economy. Thus, very large exchange rate changes would be needed. Another practical
obstacle to putting exchange rate targeting in place is that generally governments are
in charge of exchange rate policies, not the central bank. This can make it difficult to
pursue exchange rate policies as an integral part of the monetary policy strategy. Finally,
such a large and persistent depreciation can significantly affect the economies of trading
partners, which might give rise to retaliation measures.
2.4 Concluding remarks
What brings the suggested solutions to a binding zero lower bound together is their
mechanical character. However, it is not certain that a solution that works in a specific
economic model will also work in reality. Besides, all suggested solutions will in one
way or another involve costs. These two considerations may explain why the Japanese
authorities have so far not followed the non-orthodox recipes put forward.
A factor not incorporated in the models discussed is the general level of confidence.
Using the concept of liquidity preference, Keynes has shown that lack of confidence is a
crucial element of persistent zero lower bounds. In the current literature, the precondition
that a high degree of confidence must be in place to escape from a binding zero lower bound
is undervalued. Policies to increase the expected rate of inflation can only be effective if
monetary policy is credible, or if a framework is introduced that makes it credible. This
is only feasible in an environment in which the central bank can create inflation. This
implies that confidence must be in place. Otherwise, economic agents would increase
their hoarding after monetary easing. Alternative monetary transmission channels, which
feature prominently in monetarist thinking, will only be effective if economic agents spend
more after monetary easing, i.e. if they have confidence in the future. Then, economic
agents will have no incentive for excessive hoarding. On the other hand, if confidence
is lacking, the situation may arise that economic agents are characterised by liquidity
preference, and do not increase spending after monetary easing. As discussed, Gesell
money can only be expected to offer an effective escape route from a binding zero lower
bound under strict conditions. However, it may help in restoring confidence by supporting
nominal interest change effectiveness. As regards Svensson’s (2001) promising approach
offering a ‘foolproof’ way of escaping from a binding zero lower bound, it must be noticed
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that his solution works only in the specific context of his model. Because the central
bank can devaluate the exchange rate of the domestic currency without limit, its policies
will be credible. In practice, the economy is much more complicated than the stylised
model suggests. E.g. a central bank cannot steer the exchange rate precisely, as assumed
in his model. Hence, it is impossible to proof that a certain solution to the zero lower
bound will work always and everywhere. Without ‘foolproof’ solutions to the zero lower
bound, restoring confidence will be of paramount importance to steer the economic agents
towards spending more.
As long as confidence remains firmly in place, an economy may hit the zero lower
bound due to particular circumstances, but this situation will not cause severe output
losses. The Swiss case in the late 1970s offers an example. In such an environment,
monetary policy with nominal interest rates at the lower bound can be expected to be
effective. Lacking confidence, monetary policy cannot help in escaping from the zero
lower bound. With monetary policy impotent, the economy is in a liquidity trap. Japan
is currently in such a dreadful situation.
So, if there is a persistent zero lower bound and monetary policy is ineffective, the lack
of confidence may be the main challenge. Here, demand and supply factors meet. The
zero lower bound problem is usually seen as a demand side phenomenon. As the Japanese
example shows, a binding zero lower bound can persist much longer than usual demand
side problems, suggesting that confidence and supply factors also play a role. A lack of
confidence can undermine demand for a considerable span of time. The clearest example
of a joint supply and demand shock is a financial stability crisis. By definition, such a
shock implies that financial market intermediation is interrupted (supply side effect). This
will go hand in hand with lower demand, since business activity is severely hampered.
The mechanism also works the other way around. In terms of the illustrative model
(equations 2.1-2.4) an increase in the degree of confidence will manifest itself in lifting
potential output and the output gap (y), as well as the average ex ante real interest rate
over the business cycle. The average ex ante interest rate is exogenous in the model, since
it is specified in deviations from steady state. With favourable economic prospects, profit
prospects will be high, as will investors’ propensity to invest. Also, consumers’ propensity
to save will be low because future income prospects are advantageous. In general terms,
good governance, adherence to the rule of law, well-defined property rights, financial sector
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stability, and flexible markets create an environment in which the economy can flourish,
and steady state real interest rates will ceteris paribus be higher than without. What can
government policies do to bring about such a situation?
In general terms, it is important that economic agents are confident that political
leaders and economic and monetary policymakers are capable of their duties. If they
lack public confidence, people that are trusted should replace them. The policymakers
must pursue policies that restore confidence in economic prospects. As regards monetary
policy, the monetary policy strategy is important for anchoring inflationary expectations.
Actual policy decisions must show that the monetary authority acts according to its
own words. Budgetary policies can be used to increase demand, and in so doing try
to kick-start the economy. This will lift average ex ante real interest rates over the
business cycle. The average real interest rate can rise partly through a direct expenditure
channel. Expansionary fiscal policy will bring unemployed labour and capital into use,
boosting output and tax revenues. However, this channel is conditional on the absence
of Ricardian equivalence. The arguments in favour of and against Ricardian equivalence
are discussed in Bernheim (1987). It is essentially an empirical question. Barro’s (1989)
findings suggest that partial Ricardian equivalence prevails.31 Apart from the Ricardian
equivalence argument, the government may not be in a position to borrow because of a
mounting public debt,32 a loss of credibility or Stability and Growth Pact-like constraints
on government borrowing (Buiter and Panigirtzoglou, 2001). Government expenditure can
also raise the average ex ante real interest rate through an indirect confidence channel
by revitalising economic prospects. Budgetary policies can support structural policies,
for instance in financing the writing off of possible bad loans. In this context, quality
of government expenditure is important.33 Structural change can offer a lasting channel
31Ricardian equivalence does not play an explicit role in the models presented.
32With the debt to GDP ratio clearly above 100%, Japan may reach a point where the government’s
creditworthiness is so impaired that it is no longer in a position to borrow. A large debt may raise questions
about government solvency in the long run in spite of a zero interest rate, because this situation will not
last forever.
33 In contrast to popular believe, Keynes (1936) did care about the quality of public expenditure. He
preferred productive public expenditure to ‘wasteful’ expenditure. He departed from classical economics
only when he stated that — in absence of productive possibilities for public expenditure — also ‘waste-
ful’ expenditure such as pyramid-building will enrich the community on balance when the economy is
characterised by involuntary unemployment.
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to raise the average ex ante real interest rate. Of course, the direct effects of structural
policies can take many years before they bear fruit. But in the short-term they can help in
the reestablishment of confidence by improving the long-term prospects for the economy.
From a longer-term perspective, what matters is that the economic structure determines
to a large extent in what context macroeconomic demand policies work. In a zero lower
bound environment, this regards above all trend productivity growth. The key insight is
that higher productivity growth can lift low (average) ex ante real interest rates. Higher
real interest rates can be achieved via a higher ‘natural’ rate of growth (summing the
growth of the labour force and the rate of technical progress).34 A higher natural rate of
growth can result from exogenous factors, such as the emergence of a ‘New Economy’ (see
e.g. Buiter, 2000), or good structural policies. It is basically about a mixture of credible
policies that restore confidence by setting up sound old age pension systems, disability
schemes, and promote competition by reducing trade barriers, pursuing microeconomic
deregulation and similar policies. Safeguarding financial sector stability is also a key
element of these structural policies, since an advanced market economy cannot function
without efficient and effective credit intermediation.35 In sum, it is unlikely that an
economy with robust institutions and confidence firmly in place, such as the US, will end
up in a situation with a binding zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Of course,
at the end of 2001, the Fed funds rate was reduced to the low level of 1.75%. But this
must be seen against the background of sharp downward demand and confidence shocks
(terrorist attacks, a confidence fall in the ICT sector), and a synchronised international
cyclical downturn. As Fed chairman Greenspan has said at several occasions, the long-
run economic prospects of the US economy remain favourable after the tragic events of
September 11, 2001 (Greenspan, 2001b, 2002). Enhanced productivity growth is expected
to lift the US standard of living. In particular, Greenspan has stressed the health of the
financial sector, which is in sharp contrast to the Japanese situation. If an economy with
a sound underlying structure would nevertheless hit the zero lower bound, an optimistic
reassessment of expectations for economic growth by the public at large, and financial
34In the 1950s and early 1960s inflation in the US varied between approximately 0 and 4%, but the
zero bound was never reached. This is because productivity growth and average economic growth were
high, and therefore also the equilibrium real interest rate and the short-term policy rate of interest.
35Viñals (2001) discusses the interactions between financial and monetary stability in a low inflation
environment.
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market participants in particular, will be crucial for escaping from it.
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Chapter 3
On the emergence of a binding zero
lower bound
”Drittens ergibt sich aus unserm Gedankengang, dass Irrtümer des Aufschwungs
beim Eintritt und für den Verlauf der Depression eine erhebliche Rolle spielen
müssen.”
(Schumpeter, 1934)
3.1 Introduction
The zero bound on nominal interest rates has attracted a lot of attention from economists
in recent years.1 In particular, the zero interest rate monetary policy by the Bank of
Japan has triggered an intense debate on monetary policy effectiveness at low inflation and
interest rate levels. Most contributions have focused on ways to escape from a situation
in which the monetary authority is no longer able to stimulate the economy by reducing
official interest rates. For instance, Krugman (1998) emphasises the importance of lifting
expected inflation in order to reduce real market interest rates. Svensson (2001) suggests
unlimited foreign exchange intervention to initially depreciate the home currency, so as
to create inflationary expectations. The more fundamental issue of how a binding zero
lower bound can arise has attracted far less attention in the recent literature.2 This is
1This chapter is a revised version of Ullersma (2004).
2There exists a related literature on the sources of the Great Depression, with seminal contributions
by Fisher (1933) and Friedman and Schwartz (1963).
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surprising, since one might suspect that knowledge on the origins of a binding zero lower
bound can be helpful in its prevention.
The focus of this chapter is on the causes of a binding zero lower bound. On the basis
of shocks similar in magnitude to those observed historically, Orphanides and Wieland
(1998) and Reifschneider and Williams (2000) conclude that hitting the zero bound is
unlikely to occur in the US. Viñals (2001) draws the same conclusion for the euro area.
Their models do not take into account structural factors that can undermine growth
expectations and depress total demand. In Chapter 2 of this thesis it is argued that these
factors can reinforce shocks, making a binding zero lower bound more likely to occur. In
particular, mechanisms that work through the balance sheets of private households seem
capable of exacerbating cyclical fluctuations in the economy (Borio et al., 2001). Balance
sheet effects appear to have become more important over recent years, following the
increased leverage of households on financial markets. This chapter examines these issues
in a New Keynesian framework along the lines of Clarida et al. (1999), extended with a
financial accelerator mechanism. Through this mechanism, financial market imperfections
can cause pronounced amplifications of shocks. The model presented can be regarded as
a variant of the Bernanke et al. (1999) model, where the financial frictions occur on the
household instead of firm side. The dynamics are fully described by the New Keynesian
Phillips curve, an IS type equation, the external finance premium and a specification of
monetary policy. This allows for a transparent evaluation of the interaction of economic
shocks and financial market imperfections.
The chapter’s main contribution to the existing literature is that it shows analytically
how a binding zero lower bound can emerge. Financial accelerator effects that affect
households instead of firms, in conjunction with misperceptions regarding productivity
growth, appear pivotal.
The focus on consumer households instead of firms is a deviation from the traditional
approach, where cyclical variations tend to start with changes in investment. This is
where expectations about future economic developments can influence expenditure in a
non-forward looking model. However, the model of this Chapter lacks capital formation
and investment, in line with most other stylized general equilibrium models. Expectations
enter the model directly and through the balanced growth level of the real interest rate.
More optimistic expectations have an upward effect on the latter, and thus result in a
3.2. MODEL 35
more expansionary monetary policy stance at a constant policy interest rate level. This
lifts household expenditure. This effect is exacerbated by financial market frictions.3
Private households have no access to the capital market, similar to small firms. Instead
they have to turn to banks to attract loans. Banks charge a premium above the risk-free
interest rate to cover the default risk. With more fragile household balance sheets, the
risk premium increases, as is a clear feature of the US subprime mortgage market.
Uncertainty about productivity has caused an intense debate ever since US produc-
tivity growth moved to unprecedented rates in the second half of the 1990s (e.g. Roberts
(2000)). In the model, waves of misperceptions about productivity growth tend to prolong
economic cycles. A downward adjustment of overoptimistic expectations about (produc-
tivity) growth is reflected in lower labour income (labour is the only input factor). This
increases the cost of borrowing by reducing the value of private wealth/collateral, thereby
depressing current activity. The more fragile private sector balances are, the stronger will
be the effects. In case of strong effects a sharp reduction in the nominal policy interest
rate is required to boost the economy. This process can result in hitting the zero lower
bound.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 shows how the interaction of misperceptions and financial accelerator effects can
bring about a binding zero lower bound. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Model
The model used in this paper is a New Keynesian general equilibrium model that allows
for credit market imperfections in the vein of Barro (1976) and Jaffee and Russell (1976).
Representative households maximise their utility subject to a solvency condition that
implies no liability in the event of default. A competitive loan market is modeled in
which banks charge a premium to cover the default risk on household liabilities. This is
referred to as the financial accelerator mechanism. It generates an inverse relationship
between the strength of household balance sheets and the magnitude of the risk premium,
3There are clear indications that consumer households are liquidity constrained. Consumption is linked
to current income much more closely than one would expect on the basis of overlapping generations models
(Campbell and Mankiw, 1991). Balance sheet channels affecting consumers instead of firms have also
been studied by Ludvigson (1998, 1999) and Aoki et al. (2004).
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and it creates a mechanism through which the magnitude and persistence of shocks are
amplified. A Calvo (1983) type model of intermediate goods producers in a staggered price
environment is used to generate a New Keynesian Phillips curve. Three alternatives for
monetary policy are considered: an inflation targeting rule, optimal monetary policy under
discretion and optimal monetary policy under commitment from a time-less perspective.
3.2.1 IS curve
The aggregate behavioural equations follow from explicit optimisation by households and
firms along the lines of King and Wolman (1996), Woodford (2003) and Yun (1996). The
representative household is infinetely-lived. In line with Ireland (2001a) and others an
isoelastic utility function is assumed. The household’s objective is to maximise:
Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
ωt+i
(
Y 1−σt+i
1− σ + φ1
(Dt+1+i/Pt+i)
1−η
1− η − φ2
L1+φt+i
1 + φ
)}
, (3.1)
subject to a flow budget and a solvency constraint, respectively:
Dt+1 −$t+1 = max[0, Dt −$t +WtLt − PtYt + iD,tDt+1 − iL,t$t+1], (3.2)
lim
T→∞
(
1
1 + iL,T
)T (
DT |t −$T |t
) ≥ 0, (3.3)
where Y is the level of consumption, D deposits, P the consumption-based price level, L
the amount of labour supply, $ loans, W the nominal wage rate, ω the discount factor,
t the time index, and σ, η and φ are elasticities. All coefficients (mostly in Greek) are
positive, unless specified otherwise. At time t, Dt and $t are given and the household
decides on Dt+1,$t+1, Yt and Lt. $T |t denotes Et$T , i.e. the expected value of $ at T ,
expected at t. iD is the risk-free nominal interest rate on D, while iL is the risk-bearing
nominal interest rate on $. Therefore, iL,t ≥ iD,t.4 It is assumed that the monetary
authority sets iD. In a similar way as money enters the utility function in the Money-
In-the-Utility (MIU) approach, deposits enter the utility function directly. Deposits in
the utility function is used to reflect the value of deposits to facilitate transactions and
to store wealth. Since deposits yield direct utility in addition to interest income, it is
rational for households to borrow and lend at the same time. Note that negative values
4 iL,t = iD,t holds only if £t+1 = 0. This ensures that the optimum is also defined in case iL,t = iD,t.
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for end of period net financial wealth (Vt+1 = Dt+1 − $t+1) are ruled out by eq. 3.2. In
case of default the household will have a zero net financial wealth position at the end of
the period (see Section 2.2). Utility maximisation by the household leads to a familiar IS
curve, except that the risk-bearing nominal interest rate iL replaces the risk-free rate iD
(see Appendix B):
xt = xt+1|t − 1
σ
(
iL,t − πt+1|t − iL,t + π
)
, (3.4)
where xt
(
= log Yt − log Yt
)
is the output gap, and πt (= logPt − logPt−1) is the inflation
rate.5’6
3.2.2 External finance premium
The risk-bearing interest rate iL is determined in the credit market, where all borrowers
are treated symmetrically by the banks. This follows from the representative household
framework, which implies that there is no role for idiosyncratic risks or distributional
issues among households.
Following Barro (1976), consider a standard single period loan of amount $ provided
by a bank to a household at the beginning of period t. The full principal plus interest is
due at the end of the period, with the loan secured by collateral (C). Collateral consists of
all means to fulfill the household’s loan obligations, i.e. the sum of his assets and income
minus his expenditure at the end of the period:
Cept+1 = Dt + iD,tD
ep
t+1 +W
ep
t L
ep
t − P ept Y ept , (3.5)
where the superscript ep denotes ex-post values. Ct+1 is stochastic at the time of loan
negotiations, since the ex-post value of WtLt may deviate from its ex-ante value. This
follows from the assumption that changes in firms’ turnover translate one-for-one into
labour income changes. It is assumed that Ct+1 is characterised by a normal distribution
5An upper bar denotes the value that is consistent with a balanced growth path.
6The model is log-linearised around its initial balanced growth path. Of course, the accuracy of
the approximation tends to decrease if substantial divergences occur. But even then, errors due to
linearisation generally remain modest according to simulation studies (Meijdam and Verhoeven, 1998).
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with positive mean Ct+1 = Dt+ iD,tDt+1 and variance σ2C.
7 If the ex-post collateral value
(Cept+1) appears equal or higher than principal plus interest, the household will comply
with its loan obligations, and financial wealth (V ) at the end of the period is:
Vt+1 = C
ep
t+1 −$t − iL,t$t+1 = Cept+1 − (1 + iL,t)$t+1, (3.6)
since the principal paid back at the end of the period equals the amount received at the
beginning. If the ex-post collateral value turns out to be lower than its loan obligations,
the household will default, implying that Vt+1 = 0. The probability of default is (see
Appendix C):
dt = Pr
t
[
Cept+1 < (1 + iL,t)$t+1
]
=
(1+iL,t)$t+1∫
−∞
f(C)dC, (3.7)
where f (C) is a probability density function and where:
∂d
∂ ((1 + iL)$)
= f ((1 + iL,t)$t+1) . (3.8)
For clarity of exposition, it is assumed that the collateral value to the lender is zero, which
is relevant if the household were to fail.8 In addition, it is assumed that banks obtain
their funds at the constant risk-free interest rate iD and that they have no other costs.
The banking sector is characterised by representative banks and constant returns to scale,
implying that banks serve as many borrowing households as are forthcoming. They are
assumed to be risk-neutral and to maximise the expected value of their profits (Πbank):
Πbankt+1|t = (1− dt) (1 + iL,t)$t+1 − (1 + iD,t)$t+1, (3.9)
subject to eq. 3.7. With a competitive loan market, a zero expected profit condition must
hold. Therefore:
1 + iD,t = (1− dt) (1 + iL,t) . (3.10)
7Et (WtLt) = Et (PtYt) since firms are assumed to earn zero ex-ante profits and labour is the only
factor of production. See Appendix A and Appendix D.
8Decisions are taken ex ante, when the collateral is held by the borrower, who attaches value to it. The
expected value to the borrower, conditional on the fact of default, is C˜t = 1dt
∫ (1+iL)$t+1
−∞ C × f (C) dC <
(1 + iL)£t+1 (see also Appendix C). The difference between the value to the lender and the borrower
can be interpreted as transaction costs.
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For small values of iD, iL and d, this means:
iL,t ∼= iD,t + dt. (3.11)
The wedge between the interest rates on loans and (risk-free) deposits is the risk premium.
Its magnitude is determined by the probability of default.
3.2.3 Role of technological progress
It can be shown that the level of the nominal interest rate that is consistent with a
balanced growth path (iL) is determined by technological progress (see Appendix E):
iL,t ≡ rL,t + π = ρ+ μ (at+1 − at) + π, (3.12)
where rL is the real interest rate on $, ρ (= − logω) is the time discount rate, μ is a
constant determined by σ and φ in eq. 3.1, a = logA, and A is labour productivity
per hour in units of consumption goods. Higher productivity growth lifts the marginal
product of labour, and therefore the equilibrium interest rate. The relationship between
productivity growth and the interest rate in not one-for-one because it depends also on
the marginal utility of consumption (through μ). The corresponding production function
reads:
yt = at + lt, (3.13)
where l is logL. Technological progress is represented by:
at+1 − at = α + εat+1, (3.14)
where it is assumed that the technology shock is characterised by εat+1 = γε
a
t+εt+1.The AR
parameter γ signals the persistence of technology shocks. It is assumed that technology
shocks εa are unobservable. This implies that iL,t is also unobservable. Economic agents
are assumed to base their decisions on constant iL. A positive εat+1 = γεt shock will
then imply a negative deviation of the market interest rate from its balanced growth path
(iL,t − iL,t), where iL,t = iL,t|t + μ
(
at+1 − at+1|t
)
= iL,t|t + μεat+1 = iL,t|t + μγεt. The
loosening of the monetary policy stance raises demand:
x̂t = x̂t+1|t − 1
σ
(̂
iL,t − π̂t+1|t
)
+
μ
σ
γεt, (3.15)
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where hats over variables indicate log deviations from the initial balanced growth path
(= trend), except variables already in percentage terms, which are simple deviations from
their initial balanced growth path.
3.2.4 Phillips curve
Staggered nominal price setting in the spirit of Calvo (1983) is assumed. The output gap
varies proportionally with marginal costs. This results in a New Keynesian Phillips curve
(see Appendix D):
πt = ωπt+1|t + κxt, (3.16)
where the discount factor is ω (∼= 1− ρ) .
3.2.5 Monetary policy
The model is closed by a specification of monetary policy. Three different specifications
are evaluated. First, a strict inflation targeting rule. Second, optimal monetary policy
under discretion. Third, optimal monetary policy under commitment from a time-less
perspective.
In a strict inflation targeting regime, the nominal policy interest rate is steered in such
a way that the nominal market interest rate responds to inflation according to the rule:
îL,t = ρiπ̂t + ε
i
t, (3.17)
where εi covers zero-mean policy interest rate shocks. Combining eq. 3.14-3.17 results in:
⎡⎢⎢⎣
xt+1|t
πt+1|t
εat
⎤⎥⎥⎦ = B
⎡⎢⎢⎣
xt
πt
εat−1
⎤⎥⎥⎦+
⎡⎢⎢⎣
σ−1εit − μσγεt
0
εt
⎤⎥⎥⎦ , (3.18)
where
B =
⎡⎢⎢⎣
1 + κ
σω
ωρi−1
σω
0
− κ
ω
1
ω
0
0 0 γ
⎤⎥⎥⎦ . (3.19)
3.2. MODEL 41
There exists a unique stationary equilibrium if ρi > 1 (Bullard and Mitra, 2002). Assume
that the initial balanced growth path, which is characterised by x = 0, π,
(
1 + iD
)
D,(
1 + iL
)
$ and σC, is also known. Then the behaviour of dt and iD,t can be derived from
eq. 3.7, 3.8 and 3.11.
Now consider an environment where the contemporaneous values of output, inflation
and shocks cannot be observed. The IS and Phillips curve eq. can be written as:
x̂t = x̂t+1|t−1 − 1
σ
(̂
iL,t|Ωt − π̂t+1|t−1
)
+
μ
σ
γεt, (3.20)
π̂t = ωπ̂t+1|t−1 + κx̂t, (3.21)
where Ωt is the monetary authority’s information set at the time it determines the mon-
etary policy stance. The time lag in information rules out that the monetary authority
can always fully stabilise the output gap and the inflation level, even though the New
Keynesian Phillips curve eq. 3.16 does not contain a cost-push shock.
Under discretion, the monetary authority acts each period to minimize the loss func-
tion:
Losst = Et
{ ∞∑
i=0
ωi
(
π̂2t+i + λx̂
2
t+i
)}
, (3.22)
subject to eq. 3.21. The corresponding optimality condition is (Walsh, 2003):
Et {xt|Ωt} = −κ
λ
Et {πt|Ωt} . (3.23)
It follows that:
x̂It =
μ
σ
γεt, (3.24)
π̂It =
κμ
σ
γεt, (3.25)
where the superscript I refers to equilibrium values under imperfect information. Solving
for îL,t from eq. 3.20 yields îL,t = 0. îD,t and dt can be determined in the same way as in
the inflation targeting case.
Under commitment, the monetary policy authority determines a path for current and
future levels of inflation and the output gap in order to minimize the loss function eq.
3.22 subject to eq. 3.21. The optimality conditions are (Walsh, 2003):
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Et (π̂t+i + Λt+i − Λt+i−1) = 0 i ≥ 0, (3.26)
Et (λx̂t+i − κΛt+i) = 0, (3.27)
where Λ is a Lagrangian multiplier. The time-less perspective implies that condition 3.26
is also implemented in the current period (i = 0). This is the case because current values
of the output gap and inflation are the outcome from previous optimal decisions. It follows
that current levels of inflation and output depend on past developments. Combining eq.
3.16, 3.26 and 3.27 yields:
(
1 + ω +
κ2
λ
)
Et {x̂t|Ωt} = ωx̂t+1|t−1 + x̂t−1. (3.28)
The solution of this expectational difference eq. for the output gap is of the form:
Et {x̂t|Ωt} = αxx̂t−1, (3.29)
where αx is the solution less than 1 of the quadratic eq.:
ωα2x −
(
1 + ω +
κ2
λ
)
αx + 1 = 0. (3.30)
It follows that:
x̂It =
μ
σ
γεt, (3.31)
π̂It =
λ
κ
(1− αx) x̂It−1. (3.32)
Eq. 3.32 shows how past outcomes influence current policies. It implies that the monetary
authority is committed to inertia. This means that the monetary authority can steer more
effectively expected future inflation, which leads to a more favourable trade-off between
output gap and inflation variability. Again, îL,t can be determined on the basis of eq.
3.20, and îD,t and dt in the same way as in the inflation targeting case.
3.3 Transmission of technology shocks
The impact of technology shocks is illustrated in Figures 3.1-3.3, showing the impulse
responses of key variables in the case of both inflation targeting and optimal policy. The
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parameter values of the quarterly model are based on Galí (2003). The time discount
factor ω is 0.99, which is consistent with a time discount rate ρ of about 1 percent. As
to the elasticities in the utility function it is assumed that σ = η = φ = 1, which implies
that μ = 1. The scaling parameters are φ1 = φ2 = 1. Trend productivity growth α is
0.25 percent, whereas the markup in the steady state m is 0.10 (consistent with elasticity
of substitution θ = 11) and the technology shock is characterised by 50% persistence
(γ = 0.5). In the New Keynesian Phillips curve (eq. 3.16 and 3.21), κ equals 0.17, which
follows from combining the other parameter values with the assumption that prices are
fixed on average for a year (the fraction of firms that cannot change their price at t is
ϑ = 0.75). In the case of inflation targeting, it is assumed that the monetary authority
lifts the real market interest rate when inflation divergences from target: ρi = 1.5. In the
case of optimal monetary policy, a weight on output fluctuations λ = 0.25 is used in the
loss function.
If there is no initial indebtness ($ = 0) there is no lending that would cause financial
frictions. Therefore the risk premium equals 0 (d = 0), iD = iL and the model reduces to
a standard New Keynesian Model. With initial indebtness, the initial conditions influence
the risk premium and thus are relevant for the economy’s dynamics. The initial balance
growth level for the real market interest rate rL = ρ + μα = 0.01 + 0.0025 = 1.25%
(5% per annum). In addition, the inflation target π is set at 0.5% (2% per annum),
whereas it is assumed that D = 100% GDP , $ = 80% GDP and σC = 1, so that
iL = 1.75%, d0 = 0.75% and iD = 1%. These numbers imply that a 1 %-point output gap
changes the external finance premium by 0.3 %-point.
According to the model positive technology shocks can drive up the balanced growth
level of the market interest rate. With a constant actual market interest rate, this will
cause higher demand. The positive output gaps that emerge lead to increases in collateral
value and net worth, driving down the risk premium. This gives an extra boost to demand.
The monetary policy authority will react to move the economy towards the new balanced
growth path.
On the other hand, a downward revision in technology growth prospects will lower
demand and inflation pressure, both by reducing the balanced growth level of the market
interest rate and by lifting the risk premium via lower net worth. The monetary policy
authority will react by lowering the monetary policy interest rate. Economic agents adjust
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their expectations gradually and variables converge towards their new balanced growth
path, unless the necessary monetary policy loosening is unatainable because of the zero
lower bound restriction. Then, there is no stable solution and the nominal interest rate
hits the zero lower bound.
Consider the inflation targeting regime first (Figure 3.1). A downward revision in
technology growth prospects (εt = −1% GDP ) lowers the balanced growth level of the
market interest rate (iL). This implies that iL,t− iL,t increases. In other words, monetary
conditions are tightened. This negative shock to demand puts downward pressure on
inflation, leading to offsetting monetary policy loosening. The monetary policy authority
has to steer iD in such a way that the iL pattern as required by the inflation targeting rule
emerges. This requires a stronger reduction in iD than iL, since the negative output gap
implies a fall in net worth, increasing the default risk and driving up the risk premium. A
relatively modest downward revision of expected technological progress over 1.5% GDP
would require a reduction of the nominal monetary policy interest rate below 0. The zero
lower bound restriction rules out such a policy reaction. With no policy option left, there
is no stable solution to the system of equations 3.18.
In the case of optimal monetary policy, the technological shocks are not observed
contemporaneously. Therefore, the negative demand shock following a reduction in tech-
nology growth prospects causes a negative output gap and downward pressure on inflation,
as in the inflation targeting regime. Both the case of discretion (Figure 3.2) and of com-
mitment from a time-less perspective (Figure 3.3) are assessed. In both variants the
information noise is the same, which means that the negative effects on the output gap
are the same. Since the risk premium is linked to the output gap, there is no difference
either in the behaviour of this premium, which rises due to lower net worth. However,
the inflation patterns differ, which is clear from comparing eq. 3.25 and 3.32. It appears
that the deviations of inflation from target are larger in the case of commitment (from
a time-less perspective) than in the case of discretion. This is because the advantages of
commitment to inertia do not extent to unobservable shocks such as the one considered.
The difference in inflation pattern influences the market interest rate, and therefore also
the policy interest rate. In period 1 and 2 the level of the policy interest rate is slightly
lower in the commitment case, which implies that the risk of a binding zero lower bound
is marginally larger. In both cases a negative technology misperception shock of about
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Figure 3.1: Inflation targeting
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Figure 3.2: Optimal policy (discretion)
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Figure 3.3: Optimal policy (commitment from a time-less perspective)
2.5% GDP suffices to fall into a situation with a binding zero lower bound.
3.4 Concluding remarks
It follows from the analysis that a binding zero lower bound on nominal policy interest
rates can emerge when overoptimistic expectations about technological progress are re-
vised downward in an environment with fragile household balance sheets. At times, these
factors have been driving forces behind strong reductions in nominal policy interest rates
towards the zero lower bound. Calomiris (1993) draws attention to the collapse of the
’new-age’ optimism of the 1920s during the early phase of the Great Depression and its
long-run effects through the structure of credit markets and the balance sheet of borrow-
ers: from 1932 to the mid 1940s the US nominal monetary policy interest rate was close
to zero. The Japanese slump of the 1990s was also preceded by a period of overoptimism
on future economic growth. The subsequent downscaling of economic prospects, which
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was reflected in asset price declines, has lowered perceived future earning capacity and
reduced private sector balance sheets (e.g. Borio et al. (2001)). This has resulted in a
surge in non-performing loans, higher default risks and a rise in risk premiums, putting
downward pressure on the policy interest rate. From 1999 onwards the Japanese nominal
monetary policy interest rate was at or very close to the zero lower bound. Similar, but
more modest, patterns as in Japan have been observed in the US and Europe in the early
2000s, after the downward revision of ’new economy’ optimism. Nominal monetary policy
interest rates in both the US and Europe have fallen to levels not seen since the early
1960s, but they have not reached the zero lower bound. More optimistic views on future
economic growth than in Japan might be an important factor, in particular in the US. On
the other hand, in Europe household indebtness in relation to production has remained
substantially below that in the US.
Against this background, future work could focus on the empirical validation of the
model. In addition, future research could shed light on how the emergence of a binding
zero lower bound can be avoided. This paper suggests that fighting misperceptions and
the build-up of high levels of indebtness would be the best way forward. Choosing an
inflation target substantially higher than zero, increasing the room for manoeuvre for
nominal interest rates, would also be helpful.
3.5 Appendices
3.5.1 Appendix A
Social accounts
This Appendix presents an overall picture of the current transactions among the dif-
ferent sectors in the economy. There are three sectors in the economy: (consumer) house-
holds, firms, and banks. It is assumed that firms and banks have abundant net worth;
they can not default. Within the firm sector, a distinction is made between intermediate
and final goods producing firms. The banking sector also consists of two subsectors: the
central bank and the commercial banks that are the financial intermediaries. The behav-
ioural relations of the sectors are studied in the main text and in appendices B and D.
This appendix sketches the complete macroeconomic representation of the current oper-
ations in the model economy. To do so, the social accounts are presented in the tradition
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of Malinvaud (1985).
The equality between resources and uses of goods requires that production in value
terms (PtY st ) equals nominal household demand (PtY
d
t ) plus stock accumulation (∆Stock).
Labour income is paid by firms to housholds: WtLdt = WtL
s
t . The model features fully
flexible labour markets, so that the labour market clears continuously (balanced market
for labour). Therefore, changes in firms’ turnover (PtY st ) translate one-for-one into labour
income changes. Similarly, households’ interest income on deposits equals banks’ costs
(iD,tDst+1 = iD,tD
d
t+1). The central bank steers the (risk-free) interest rate on deposits.
On the other hand, households’ interest costs on loans are a source of income for the
banks (iL,t$dt+1 = iL,t$
s
t+1). For households, the excess of income over costs results in an
increase in deposits or a decrease in loans. For banks, this implies higher cash holdings,
while firms’ cash holdings decline and their stock levels rise. This is presented in the
social accounts below, no default case.
Note that savings by different sectors (Shholds, Sfirms, Sbanks) can not be measured
on their own. Savings are notional in the sense of Clower (1965). Note also that the
social accounts involve ex-post amounts, whereas supply and demand decisions involve
ex-ante amounts. In this respect, it is assumed that firms earn zero ex-ante profits,
implying that stock accumulation is not planned, nor is a change in cash holdings. Ex-
post, unanticipated real shocks can cause a rise or fall in PtY st . WtLt and PtY
s
t cancel out.
If a rise occurs in PtY st , the balanced labour market implies that there is an instantaneous
distribution of additional labour income to households. Hence, there is excess supply of
goods, a buyers’ market for goods cf. Malinvaud (1985): PtY dt < PtY
s
t (=WtLt). If PtY
s
t
falls, there is excess demand for goods, a sellers’ market for goods in terms of Malinvaud:
PtY
d
t > PtY
s
t (= WtLt) . With excess demand for goods, there are two possibilities. Either
the households will still be able to comply with their loan obligations, or they will default.
In the former case, there will be a deposit/cash transfer from households via the banking
sector to firms, which will lower their stocks (social accounts, no default case). In the
latter case, collateral will be transfered from the insolvent households to the banks, which
will replenish the households’ payments (social accounts, default case).
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Social accounts, no default
Households Firms Banks
resources uses resources uses resources uses
PtY dt PtY
s
t ∆Stockst
WtL
s
t WtL
d
t
iD,tD
s
t+1 iL,t$
d
t+1 iL,t$
s
t+1 iD,tD
d
t+1
Shholdst S
firms
t S
banks
t
Shholdst S
firms
t S
banks
t
$t+1 −$t Dt+1 −Dt Dt+1 −Dt $t+1 −$t
∆Casht ∆Casht
Social accounts, default
Households Firms Banks
resources uses resources uses resources uses
PtY
d
t PtY
s
t ∆Stockst
WtL
s
t WtL
d
t
iD,tD
s
t+1 iD,tD
d
t+1
Shholdst S
firms
t S
banks
t
Shholdst S
firms
t S
banks
t
−Dt + Ct+19 −Dt + Ct+1
∆Casht ∆Casht
3.5.2 Appendix B
Derivation of the IS curve
This Appendix shows how the consumer maximisation problem (eq. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3) leads
to the Euler equation/IS curve (eq. 3.4 in the main text).
Taken together, the flow budget constraint eq. 3.2 and the solvency constraint eq. 3.3
can be rewritten as an intertemporal budget constraint:
9£t+1 −Dt+1 = 0, Ct+1 = Dt + iD,tDt+1 +WtLt − PtYt.
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Dt −$t = 1
1 + iL,t
Et (Dt+1 −$t+1) + PtYt −WtLt + (iL,t − iD,t)Dt+1
= Et
∞∑
i=0
1
(1 + iL,t)
t+i+1
⎧⎨⎩ Pt+iYt+i −Wt+iLt+i+(iL,t − iD,t)Dt+i+1
⎫⎬⎭ . (3.33)
Combining this eq. with eq. 3.1 leads to the following Lagrangian:
Zt = Et
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
∑∞
i=0 ω
t+i
(
Y 1−σt+i
1−σ + φ1
(Dt+1+i/Pt+i)
1−η
1−η − φ2
L
1+φ
t+i
1+φ
)
+
zt
⎛⎝Vt −∑∞i=0 1(1+iL,t)t+i+1
⎛⎝ Pt+iYt+i −Wt+iLt+i
+(iL,t − iD,t)Dt+1+i
⎞⎠⎞⎠
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎭ , (3.34)
where zt is the Lagrange multiplier and initial financial wealth Vt (= Dt −$t) is prede-
termined.
The first order conditions are:
δZt
δYt+i|t
= ωt+iY −σt+i|t − zt
Pt+i|t
(1 + iL,t)
t+i+1 = 0, (3.35)
δZt
δ
(
Dt+1+i|t
Pt+i|t
) = ωt+iφ1(Dt+1+i|tPt+i|t
)−η
− zt (iL,t − iD,t)Pt+i|t
(1 + iL,t)
t+i+1 = 0 (3.36)
δZt
δLt+i|t
= −ωt+iφ2Lφt+i|t + zt
Wt+i|t
(1 + iL,t)
t+i+1
= 0. (3.37)
By combining the equations for Yt with their t+1 counterpart, one obtains the Euler
equation:
ω
(
Yt+1|t
Yt
)−σ
=
1
1 + iL,t
(
Pt+1|t
Pt
)
. (3.38)
Linearisation of eq. 3.38 around its balanced growth path results in the IS curve (eq.
3.4):
xt = xt+1|t − 1
σ
(
iL,t − πt+1|t − ρ
)
, (3.39)
where ρ = − logω.
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3.5.3 Appendix C
This Appendix elaborates on eq. 3.5- 3.11 on the risk premium.
Probability of default
The value of the collateral at the end of the period (Ct+1) is a random variable at
the start of the period. It is assumed that Ct+1 is distributed with a normal distribution
with positive mean Ct+1(= (1 + iD,t)Dt+1, since WtLt and PtYt cancel out ex-ante) and
variance σ2C.
As regards the numerical example in Section 3 of the main text: initial deposits
are 100% GDP, initial loans are 80% GDP , σC = 1 and iL = 1.75%. It follows from
the cumulative Normal distribution that Ct+1 = (1 + 0.01)100 = 101 and Pr[C
ep
t+1 <
(1 + iL,t)$t+1] = Pr[C
ep
t+1 < (1 + 0.0175) 80] = 0.75%. The external finance premium is
also 0.75% (eq. 3.11). The corresponding z-value in the cumulative normal distribution
for a default risk of 0.75% is 2.43. An output gap shock results in a shock of the same
magnitude to the collateral value, which implies that a 1% GDP negative output gap
lowers Ct+1 − (1 + iL,t)$t+1by 5% of its initial magnitude. This corresponds to a fall in
the z-value to 2.31, or a default risk of 1.05%.
Alternative loan contract
Suppose that the borrower transfers the collateral to the bank in case of default and
that the collateral value to the bank equals that to the borrower. Then the banks maximise
expected profits:
Πbankt+1|t = (1− dt) (1 + iL,t)$t+1 + dtC˜t − (1 + iD,t)$t+1, (3.40)
where the mean value of the collateral, conditional on the fact of default is:
C˜t =
1
dt
∫ (1+iL)$t+1
−∞
C × f (C) dC. (3.41)
Under the same assumptions as in the main text, the equilibrium condition is:
1 + iD,t = (1− dt) (1 + iL,t) + dt C˜t
$t+1|t
. (3.42)
Assuming fixed $, this implies iD,t ≈ iL,t − dt + const.
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3.5.4 Appendix D
This Appendix explains the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips curve (eq. 3.16).
Firms: real aspects
Final output is produced using inputs from a continuum of intermediate goods produc-
ers. The model features perfect competition among final goods producers. The production
function for final output is given by the following CES aggregator (in the tradition of Dixit
and Stiglitz (1977)):
Yt =
(∫ h
0
Yt(j)
θ−1
θ dj
) θ
θ−1
j ∈ [0, h] , θ > 1, (3.43)
where θ is the elasticity of substitution between inputs. As θ increases, inputs become
closer substitutes; alternatively, market power of intermediate goods producers is decreas-
ing in θ. Yt is the period-t final output of consumption goods and Yt (j) is the input of
intermediate good j in period t. There are h intermediate goods producing firms.10 Final
goods producers minimise the costs of producing Yt:
∫ h
0
Pt (j)Yt (j) dj (3.44)
subject to the production function of final output eq. 3.43. Pt (j) is the price of input j
in period t. The first order condition is:11
−Pt (j) + Λ1 θ
θ − 1
(∫ h
0
Yt (j)
θ−1
θ dj
) 1
θ−1 θ − 1
θ
Yt (j)
− 1
θ = 0, (3.45)
where marginal costs (=Lagrangian multiplier (Λ1)) equal the price of the final output,
since the final goods producer operates in a competitive market. Therefore, the demand
for a single input j is a decreasing function of its relative price:
Yt (j)
Yt
=
(
Pt (j)
Pt
)−θ
, (3.46)
where
Pt =
(∫ h
0
Pt (j)
1−θ dj
) 1
1−θ
. (3.47)
10A limited number of intermediate goods producing firms gives rise to a discrete production function
for final output. This discrete function is approximated by its continuous representation in eq. 3.43.
11Note that eq. 3.43 is continuously differentiable and satisfies the Inada conditions.
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Pt represents the amount the final goods producer obtains for one unit of the composite
good Ct. Eq. 3.46 can be rewritten in log-linear terms as:
yt (j) = −θ (pt (j)− pt) + yt. (3.48)
The intermediate goods market is monopolistically competitive, so that suppliers be-
have as price setters. Cournot behaviour is assumed. In other words, all firms behave
as if they are completely independent of each other. Each firm produces a differentiated
good with technology:
Yt (j) = AtLt (j) , (3.49)
where At is an aggregate technology index. Eq. 3.49 can be expressed in log-linear form
as:
yt (j) = at + lt (j) . (3.50)
Given the representative agent character of the model, this eq. can be written as eq.
3.13. Technological progress is characterised by:
log
(
At
At−1
)
= α+ εat , (3.51)
where εat is a technology shock. In line with the real business cycle theory (e.g. Cogley
and Nason (1995)) it is assumed that new techniques, once introduced, will be available
forever. Eq. 3.51 can be rewritten as in eq. 3.14.
The intermediate goods producing firm’s objective is to maximise profits (Π (j)):
Πt (j) = Pt (j)Yt (j)−WtLt (j) (3.52)
subject to the demand function eq. 3.46 and the production function for intermediate
goods eq. 3.49. The wage rate is assumed exogenous to the firm. The first order conditions
with respect to Yt(j), Pt(j) and Lt(j) are:
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Pt (j)− Λ2 + Λ3 = 0, (3.53)
Yt (j)− θΛ2Pt (j)−1
(
Pt
Pt (j)
)θ
Yt = 0, (3.54)
−Wt + Λ3At = 0. (3.55)
It follows that:
Λ2 =
Pt (j)
θ
, (3.56)
Λ3 =
Wt
At
, (3.57)
Pt (j) =
θ
θ − 1
Wt
At
, (3.58)
where θ
θ−1 is the mark-up per unit Yt (j) . Real marginal costs are the inverse of the
mark-up: θ−1
θ
. Combining eq. 3.49 and eq. 3.58 results in the labour demand function:
Ldt (j) =
Yt (j)
At (j)
=
θ−1
θ
Yt (j)
Wt
Pt(j)
, (3.59)
which can be rewritten in log-linear form as:
ldt (j) = yt (j)− at = yt (j) −wt + pt + log
θ − 1
θ
. (3.60)
It is assumed that positive economic profits will instantaneously attract new firms into
the intermediate goods industry, competing the profits away. Similarly, negative profits
will drive away firms from the industry. This assumption is more common in long-term
than in short-term models such as the one under consideration. It simplifies the analysis
without changing it significantly. In line with this entry/exit assumption, a zero-profit
restriction is introduced:
Pt (j)Yt (j) = WtLt (j) . (3.61)
Since all firms behave in exactly the same way, it follows from eq. 3.49 and 3.58 that
the price set by the representative firm can be written as:
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Pt (j) =
1
h
(∫ h
0
Pt (i)
1−θ di
) 1
1−θ
=
θ
θ−1Wt
1
h
∫ h
0
Lt (i) di
1
h
(∫ h
0
Yt (i)
θ−1
θ di
) θ
θ−1
. (3.62)
For the economy as a whole, this eq. can be rewritten as follows:
Pt (j) =
h θ
θ−1WtLt
Yt
. (3.63)
With representative firms, Lt(j)
Yt(j)
= Lt
Yt
. It is clear from eq. 3.61 and 3.63 that h θ
θ−1 = 1;
the number of intermediate producing firms equals θ−1
θ
.
Firms: price setting12
Some sort of price stickiness is critical to generating significant real effects of monetary
policy. Intermediate goods producing firms do not adjust their product prices flexibly
to maintain a constant, profit-maximising mark-up. Instead, firms balance over time
the one-time cost of changing prices against the benefit of staying close to the profit-
maximising level of the mark-up.13 This is a common assumption in the New Keynesian
literature. Staggered nominal price setting along the lines of Calvo (1983) is assumed.
The intermediate goods producing firm is in a position to set a new price for her good at
time t. The price will apply at time t with certainty, with probability ϑ at time t+1, with
probability ϑ2 at time t+2, and so on. Provided a profit maximising solution exists, such
a solution is characterised by the minimisation of production costs, which are conditional
on the frequency of future price adjustments:
min
P∗t
∞∑
k=0
Et
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
(
Yt+i
Yt
)−σ
(ωϑ)k
(
Yt+k(j)
At+k
)1+θ
1 + θ
⎫⎪⎬⎪⎭ (3.64)
subject to:
∞∑
k=0
ϑkEt
{(
1
1 + iL,t
)k
P ∗t Yt+k (j)
}
≤ Vt, (3.65)
12For a complete treatment of the derivation of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, see Goodfriend and
King (1997), King and Wolman (1996) and Woodford (2003).
13Deviations from the optimal price level trigger the entry or exit of new firms.
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Yt+k (j)
Yt+k
=
(
P ∗t
Pt+k
)−θ
. (3.66)
This results in a solution for the optimal price P ∗t . Since the optimal price is the same
for all goods, the actual price at time T will either equal the price at T − 1, or be at the
optimal level. The price index eq. 3.47 can be simplified as follows:
Pt =
(
ϑP 1−θt−1 + (1− ϑ) (P ∗t )1−θ
) 1
1−θ
. (3.67)
The fraction of firms 1 − ϑ that can change their price at t all choose the price level
P ∗, since the optimal price level is the same for the differentiated products produced. The
index of prices for non-adjusting firms equals the lagged price level due to the law of large
numbers. Eq. 3.67 can be used to derive an expression in terms of inflation:
πt = ωπt+1|t +
(1− ϑ) (1− ωϑ)
ϑ
(mct −mc) , (3.68)
πt = ωπt+1|t +
(1− ϑ) (1− ωϑ)
ϑ (1 + θφ)
(φ+ σ) (yt − yt) , (3.69)
πt = ωπt+1|t + κxt. (3.70)
This is the so-called New Keynesian Phillips curve, which is reproduced in eq. 3.16
in the main text. It expresses that firms base their pricing behaviour on expected future
marginal costs. Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) show that there is an approximate
relation between marginal costs and output. The longer prices are fixed on average, the
less sensitive is inflation to changes in the output gap. Expected inflation is incorporated,
since expected future output gaps influence current inflation.
3.5.5 Appendix E
This Appendix explains the derivation of eq. 3.12, which specifies the balanced growth
path for the nominal interest rate.
Balanced growth path
At the balanced growth path, all intermediate goods producing firms will choose a
markup
(
θ
θ−1
)
in conformity with eq. 3.58 of the Appendix. This implies that log real
marginal costs (mc) and the log of the markup (−m) can be written as (Galí, 2003):
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mc = −m = log
(
θ − 1
θ
)
= wt − pt − at. (3.71)
Taking acount of the first order conditions that follow from the household’s utility
maximisation and eq. 3.60, the balanced growth equilibrium is characterised as follows:
mc = − log φ2 + (φ+ σ) yt − (1 + φ) at, (3.72)
yt = −
− log φ2 +m
φ+ σ
+
1 + φ
φ+ σ
at, (3.73)
lt = yt − at = −
− logφ2 +m
φ+ σ
+
1− σ
φ+ σ
at, (3.74)
rL,t ≡ iL,t − π = ρ+ σ 1 + φ
φ+ σ
(at+1 − at) = ρ+ μ (at+1 − at) , (3.75)
where μ = σ 1+φ
φ+σ
. Eq. 3.75 corresponds to eq. 3.12.
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Chapter 4
Financial acceleration of booms and
busts
”A central bank can contain inflation over time under most conditions. But
do we have the capability to eliminate booms and busts? The answer, in my
judgment, is no, because there is no tool to change human nature or to predict
human behaviour with great confidence.”
(Greenspan, 2001a)
4.1 Introduction
Since the 1970s, many countries have gone through equity busts.1 Stock price correc-
tions are often associated with sharp falls in economic activity and financial instability.
Nonetheless, the importance of equity and other financial variables has long been ignored
in the mainstream macro-economic literature. Under the Modigliani-Miller propositions,
financial factors are irrelevant for firms’ investment behaviour. Recently, the so-called
‘credit channel’ or ‘financial accelerator’ theory has drawn attention to financial frictions.
This new literature, which is based on micro foundations, attaches a key role to credit
and asset prices in the transmission mechanism (e.g. Bernanke et al., 1999).
A key question is whether the role of financial factors in propagating and amplifying
economic shocks can also be observed in practice. Given the surge in financial markets in
1This chapter is a revised version of Kakes and Ullersma (2005).
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the past decades, this issue has become increasingly relevant. In particular, studies based
on micro-data have established that financial constraints indeed play a role in explaining
the behaviour of individual firms and consumers (see Hubbard, 1998, for a survey). So far,
evidence based on macro-economic data has been less conclusive, largely on account of
identification problems. Although less rigorous, macro-based studies are important to get
insight into the quantitative importance of financial accelerator effects at the aggregate
level. This chapter provides new evidence on the financial accelerator based on macro-
data. The focus is on periods around equity busts, which represent strong downward
revisions in economic prospects and losses in financial wealth.
Section 2 presents a brief outline of the underlying theory, on the basis of which
hypotheses are formulated. After discussing the methodology for testing these hypotheses
in Section 3, Section 4 discusses the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. I find empirical
support for financial accelerator effects around asset price busts in the second half of the
sample, with the typical bust followed by a reduction in nominal policy interest rates.
4.2 Financial determinants of economic cycles
Kindleberger (1978) and Minsky (1982) present early examples of macro-economic theories
in which financial frictions play a prominent role. They stress the instability of the
interaction between credit, equity prices and economic activity. Others have focused on
financial wealth accumulation, in particular the relationship between asset prices and
consumption. A survey by Poterba (2000) shows that this link is modest — with a $1
increase in financial assets leading to 3 cents of additional income — as one would expect
on the basis of Friedman’s permanent income hypothesis. In addition, financial factors
can influence investment through Tobin’s q. If the market value of a firm’s capital is
higher than its replacement value (q > 1), expansion of the capital stock is profitable.
However, the empirical link between Tobin’s q and investment is weak (e.g. Hayashi,
1982).
In the more recent literature, financial frictions have been studied in a financial accel-
erator framework (Bernanke et al., 1999, and the references therein). The emphasis is on
credit market imperfections, which are caused by problems of information, incentives and
enforcement. These imperfections can be mitigated by aligning the borrower’s incentives
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to those of the lender, which will be the case if the borrower risks substantial financial
losses. Hence, credit will be extended at a lower cost to borrowers with strong financial
positions. The wedge between the cost of external funds and the risk-less interest rate
is inversely related to the borrower’s net worth. Bernanke et al. (1999) refer to this
wedge as the external finance premium. Since net worth is procyclical, the external fi-
nance premium declines in booms and rises in recessions. This creates an amplification
mechanism, which is called the financial accelerator. Typically, a financial cycle starts
with a build-up phase during which real and financial imbalances accumulate (Bordo and
Jeanne, 2002, and Borio and Lowe, 2002). This phase is characterized by an increase
in spending, overoptimistic growth expectations, and a low risk assessment by both bor-
rowers and lenders (Asea and Blomberg, 1998). This process can be self-reinforcing, as
rising asset prices improve borrower net worth, stimulating credit expansion and invest-
ment, which further drives up asset prices, etcetera. At some point, however, economic
agents will realize that developments are unsustainable and the process will be reversed.
Hence, economic growth perceptions are revised, leading to a downward correction in
stock prices. Experiences since the mid-1990s seem to be in line with this description of
the financial cycle, given the favourable economic prospects that were widely attributed
to new developments in Information and Communication Technology (ICT). In the event,
however, market sentiment turned against this notion of a ‘New Economy’ and stock
prices collapsed, followed by an economic downturn in most countries.
The effects of the financial accelerator may be particularly severe in a low inflation en-
vironment, where the lower bound on nominal interest rates is an impediment to monetary
policy. Demand can decline sharply after a downward revision of long-term growth per-
spectives, since the initial effects are exacerbated by financial factors, particularly through
higher external finance premiums (see Chapter 3). As a result, the central bank has a
strong incentive to lower the nominal policy interest rate, in order to limit the impact of
a bust. This may result in policy interest rates hitting the lower zero bound, which seems
close to the situation in Japan in the 1990s.
The most convincing empirical evidence for the existence of a financial accelerator
is provided by micro-based studies. Disaggregated data show that particular groups of
firms and households face more financial constraints than others, which can be linked
to differences in their financial positions and information asymmetries (see e.g. Gilchrist
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and Zakrajsek, 1998; Hubbard, 1998). So far, the macro-economic evidence for financial
accelerator effects is limited. Gertler and Lown (1999) and Mody and Taylor (2003)
present some macro evidence for the United States, using the bond spread as a proxy
for the external finance premium. In an earlier paper, Bernanke (1983) presents evidence
that financial factors explain the severity of the Great Depression. Another strand of
literature based on aggregate data, initiated by Bernanke and Blinder (1992), investigates
the importance of credit market imperfections in the transmission of monetary policy.
In this chapter, I take the existence of a financial accelerator from micro-based studies
as given and consider some implications of the financial accelerator at the aggregate
level. This chapter provides insight into the macroeconomic importance of the financial
accelerator. In particular, the following three macroeconomic consequences of the financial
accelerator prior to and after an equity bust are investigated:
1. Given the build-up phase that characterizes financial cycles, an equity bust is likely
to be preceded by buoyant credit growth.
2. If equity busts are triggered by deteriorating financial conditions, this should be
reflected by an external finance premium hike.
3. If equity busts reflect downward revisions of economic prospects and lift external
finance premiums, they are expected to be followed by expansionary monetary pol-
icy.
4.3 Methodology and data
The hypotheses formulated in the previous section are investigated by using a probit
model. In particular, I look at the explanatory power of several macro-economic variables
prior to equity busts, which reflect downward revisions in the long-term economic growth
perspective. A panel of 20 industrialized countries over the period 1970 - 2002 is consid-
ered, which includes a sufficient number of equity busts to investigate general patterns.2
2The countries concerned are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Particularities of individual cases are not the focus of this paper. All results are pooled
estimations of all countries, using annual observations.
An equity price bust is an extended period of unusual equity price declines in compar-
ison to normal trend growth. Although annual data are used in the estimations - partly
due to data constraints - the identification of equity busts is based on quarterly stock
prices in order to obtain a more refined pattern.3 I follow Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and
define a bust as a period in which the real average asset price change over a 12-quarter
window is smaller than a threshold. This threshold is the average growth rate of asset
prices in all countries over the entire sample (g), minus x times its standard deviation v:
12∑
l=1
gi,t−l
12
≤ g − xv. (4.1)
There are two ad-hoc elements in this definition: the length of the window and the value
of parameter x. Following Bordo and Jeanne I choose a twelve-quarter window, which is
sufficient to filter out short-term volatility. The number of bust episodes is not sensible
to the exact choice of the timespan. The parameter x is calibrated such that the main
bust episodes are selected, without including too many observations. For this purpose,
x is set at 0.8, but alternative values have been considered, see Section 4.2 below. The
main boom-bust periods are plausible when compared to other sources. In particular,
most boom-bust patterns for individual countries closely match the results of Bordo and
Jeanne, despite some differences between their data set and ours. Furthermore, the IMF
(2003) finds similar patterns using a very different methodology (Figure 4.1).4 Following
the procedure of this chapter, 35 stock market busts have occured over the period we
consider (see Appendix B). Busts are concentrated in three subperiods, reflecting the
strong correlation of international stock markets.
Both real and financial indicators are examined in relation to equity busts: industrial
production, gross domestic product, private investment (capital formation), inflation,
short-term and long-term interest rates, money, credit, asset prices (equity and residential
3In our estimations a year is considered part of a bust period if it includes one or more quarters that
have been identified as a bust in our procedure.
4Bordo and Jeanne (2002) and IMF (2003) do not include the most recent equity busts. In addition,
they consider slightly different groups of countries. Bordo and Jeanne do not include Austria, Belgium,
Korea, New Zealand, Portugal and Switzerland; the IMF does not include Korea and Portugal.
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Figure 4.1: Equity busts
property), and the external finance premium.5 For the latter, I use the interest rate spread
of private debt over government debt, a standard measure of the private sector’s risk
premium. While the private debt interest rate series are not as accurate and consistent
across countries as one would like (see Appendix A), the results show that the spread
does have important characteristics of the external finance premium.
Appendix C presents cross-correlations of all variables included in the analysis, at
an annual frequency. Most of these have plausible signs. Nominal interest rates are
positively correlated with each other and with inflation, and negatively related to real
activity (industrial production, GDP, investment), money and credit growth, and asset
prices. Positive correlations also exist between real activity measures, and between money
and credit. The interest rate spread is negatively related to real activity, again in line
with what one would expect.
In the estimations, two subperiods are considered: 1970-1986 and 1987-2002. This
splits the sample into two equal parts, which roughly corresponds to a distinction between
5Most data are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics database, see Appendix A for
an overview.
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pre and post financial liberalization (Bakker and Chapple, 2002; see Figure 4.2). These
subsamples are more homogeneous periods than the entire sample, and also allow to take
into account changes over time.
4.4 Empirical results
4.4.1 Explaining equity busts
Table 4.1 presents the results of probit estimations with only one explanatory variable.
Each entry in the table represents a separate equation, in which the equity bust dummy is
explained by a constant and one particular lag of a variable. Including lags up to 8 years, it
can be investigated to what extent equity busts are related to developments several years
earlier.6 This accords with the idea that imbalances build up over a long period prior
to a correction. As the estimated coefficients of probit models are difficult to interpret
6This approach follows Estrella and Mishkin (1998), who investigate leading indicator properties of
several financial variables in order to predict recessions in the United States.
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directly, the table reports the marginal impact of the regressors. This so-called ‘slope
derivative’ is evaluated at the sample means of the data and can be interpreted as the
increase in the probability of an equity bust due to a one-unit change in the explanatory
variable. The results in Table 4.1 are useful to address the first two hypotheses that were
formulated in Section 2.
The first hypothesis states that a financial accelerator manifests itseld by increasing
credit growth in the years before equity bust. This is only supported for the most recent
subperiod.
According to our second hypothesis, a stock market bust should be triggered by an
increase in the external finance premium. Again, this is supported only for the most
recent subperiod, for which the proxy for the external finance premium — the interest rate
spread — is significant for the one-year lag. For the first subperiod, none of the lags is
significant.
An interesting observation for both subperiods is that several variables seem to be
relevant long before a stock market correction takes place. The explanatory power of
industrial production, gross domestic product and investment is strongest two to six years
prior to the equity bust. The same holds for money and credit growth. This suggests
that stock market exuberance may be the result of long cumulative processes initiated by
loose monetary conditions. In this context, it is worthwhile to observe that higher inflation
significantly raises the probability of an equity bust up to three years in advance. Inflation
is a sign of overheating, which may induce the downward revision of economic prospects.
More specifically, inflation may drive up interest rates. It is interesting to see that the
coefficients for interest rates and the interest rate spread - albeit not always significant
- have a negative sign for long lags and a positive sign for short lags. Altogether, these
results suggest that easy financial conditions in combination with high production and
investment growth contribute significantly to the boom-bust cycle in equity prices.
Finally, asset prices have significant explanatory power. For stock prices themselves,
this is an obvious result as it directly reflects the boom-bust cycle. For house prices, the
explanatory power is likely to be related to the investment boom prior to the stock price
correction, also given the correlation between house prices and investment, money and
credit growth.
The next step is to analyse the external finance premium in a probit model with several
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Lag 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Variable Estimated slope coefficients 1970-1986 ∗
Short-term interest 0.60 0.13 -0.67 -1.22b -1.00b -1.31b -1.39a -0.93a
Long-term interest 0.73 0.40 0.10 -0.26 -0.41 -0.75 -1.17c -1.43b
Inflation 2.19a 1.77a 0.88b -0.05 -0.87c -1.64a -1.73a -1.92a
Industrial production 0.25 0.55 0.73b 1.02a 1.04a 1.32a 1.24a 1.22a
Gross domestic product 0.76 1.34b 1.11c 1.55a 1.37b 1.11c 0.94 0.47
Investment 0.48c 0.64b 1.34a 1.44a 1.35a 0.92a 0.71b 0.66b
M3 growth -0.11 0.07 0.58c 1.15a 1.11a 1.17a 0.95b 0.85b
Credit growth -0.47 -0.10 0.30 0.45 0.30 0.45 0.49 0.57
Interest rate spread 2.00 2.97 0.10 -0.31 -1.04 1.08 0.98 0.72
Stock prices -0.44a -0.40a -0.22b 0.09 0.32a 0.31a 0.34a 0.26b
House prices 0.64b 1.08a 1.09a 0.85a 0.08 -0.06 -0.12 -0.03
Estimated slope coefficients 1987-2002 ∗
Short-term interest 1.20b 0.48 -0.29 -0.65 -0.59 -0.71 -0.80 -0.44
Long-term interest 1.35b 0.40 -0.33 -0.79 -0.58 -0.43 -0.42 0.06
Inflation 3.86a 2.46a 1.22 0.59 0.33 0.08 0.22 0.53
Industrial production -0.27 0.97c 1.41a 1.25b 1.25b 1.69a 1.29a 0.75
Gross domestic product 0.71 2.60a 3.28a 2.76a 2.00b 1.83b 1.35 0.07
Investment 0.85a 1.64a 1.27a 0.81b 0.70b 0.73b 0.09 -0.54c
M3 growth 0.95b 1.21b 1.73a 1.50a 1.03b 0.53 0.02 -0.14
Credit growth 0.88b 1.09a 0.99b 0.75c 0.29 0.30 -0.19 -0.60
Interest rate spread 4.29b -0.06 -1.94 -3.94 -4.30b -3.43 -3.97b -7.20a
Stock prices -0.33a 0.01 0.37a 0.39a 0.31a 0.16 0.22b 0.10
House prices 0.82a 1.34a 1.28a 0.68b 0.13 -0.15 -0.46 -0.69b
∗Explanation: the subscripts a, b and c denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level. Slope derivatives, which report the marginal impact at the sample means, are multiplied by
100 to convert them into percentage points. The number of observations varies between 135 and 338
in the first subperiod, and between 264 and 320 in the second.
Table 4.1: Probit analysis for individual regressors
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regressors (Table 4.2). I consider a baseline equation including three key macroeconomic
variables — inflation, industrial production and the long-term interest rate — which is
extended by several representations of the interest rate spread. All regressors are included
with one lag. Table 4.2 also includes the ‘pseudo R2’ as a goodness of fit measure.7 Like in
Table 4.1, the spread and the interest rate are more significant for the recent subsample.
The approach in Table 4.2 is also useful to investigate the third hypothesis in Section
2, i.e. whether equity busts are followed by a more expansionary monetary policy. To
explore this, the observations are split into two parts: those that are followed by a mon-
etary expansion — i.e. decreasing short-term interest rate — in the subsequent year, and
those followed by a monetary contraction. The results for the two subsamples are very
different. In the first period, the spread is only significant for observations followed by a
monetary contraction, while in the most recent period, the spread is only significant when
accompanied by a monetary expansion. Hence, only the latter is in line with the hypoth-
esis that a downward revision of long-term prospects which is exacerbated by financial
factors causes downward pressure on the nominal policy interest rate. Presumably, the
role of financial variables has increased on account of financial deepening. To investigate
this, log
(
credit
GDP
)
is added as a proxy for financial development, multiplied by the external
finance premium. Again, this interaction term is only statistically significant in the sec-
ond subperiod, implying a positive relationship between financial development and the
short-run impact of the external finance premium.
4.4.2 Robustness
Several robustness checks were performed:
• In the results shown in the tables a threshold value x = 0.8 is used to determine
7The pseudoR2 can be directly derived from the regression, which is estimated by maximum likelihood,
and is defined as
1−
(
logLu
logLc
)−(2/n) logLc
where Lu is the estimated likelihood of the equations presented in Table 2 (i.e. ‘unconstrained’). Lc is
the likelihood under the constraint that all coefficients except the intercept are zero, i.e. the dependent
variable is explained by only a constant. n is the number of observations. The pseudo R2 will always be
between zero (no fit) and one (perfect fit). See Estrella and Mishkin (1998) for a further discussion.
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Variable Estimated slope coefficients 1970-1986 ∗
Constant -28.4a -32.0a -33.0a -30.3a -31.7a
Inflation (t-1) 1.76a 2.26a 2.31a 2.15a 2.27a
Industrial production (t-1) 0.46c 0.68b 0.96a 0.44 0.68b
L-t interest rate (t-1) -0.62 -0.51 -0.44 -0.64 -0.56
Interest rate spread (t-1) 2.01 1.40
Mon. expansion spread (t-1)∗∗ 0.99
Mon. contraction spread (t-1)∗∗ 4.65c
Spread (t-1) * financial deepening -0.26
# observations 306 245 134 111 240
pseudo R2 0.08902 0.18035 0.21608 0.17331 0.18058
Variable Estimated slope coefficients 1987-2002 ∗
Constant -31.33a -24.7a -18.9c -34.4b -25.3a
Inflation (t-1) 9.79a 4.56b 2.48 6.74c 4.66b
Industrial production (t-1) -0.24 0.18 1.07 -1.08 0.07
L-t interest rate (t-1) -3.94b -3.05c -2.90 -2.63 -2.74c
Interest rate spread (t-1) 4.68b 5.07c
Mon. expansion spread (t-1)∗∗ 6.28c
Mon. contraction spread (t-1)∗∗ 1.88
Spread (t-1) * financial deepening 2.31a
# observations 319 268 148 120 262
pseudo R2 0.07915 0.03918 0.06113 0.05286 0.07669
∗See Table 1.
∗∗Only includes observations that are followed, respectively, by a monetary
expansion or a monetary contraction (measured by the short-term interest rate).
Table 4.2: Extended probit analysis
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equity bust episodes. Although this gives plausible equity bust episodes which
broadly correspond with other studies, it is important to check the robustness of
the results to a change in x. Using x = 1.0 already leads to a substantial reduction
in crisis observations (by about half), but the main results and conclusions remain
intact. When larger thresholds are used, too many crisis observations are thrown
away to be able to perform analyses.
• I repeated the analysis with the equity busts episodes derived by Bordo and Jeanne
(2002) and IMF (2003). As shown in Figure 4.1, both patterns of aggregated equity
busts are similar to this chapter’s indicator, although some countries and most of
the recent bust episodes are missing in these studies. With some exceptions, the
results of these two alternative indicators are similar, and do not lead to different
conclusions. In many cases the results are even more pronounced. At the same
time, the proxy for the external finance premium — the credit spread — performs
worse than in the estimations with this chapter’s indicator for busts. Presumably,
this is because the recent equity busts — which largely determine the results of the
second subsample — are missing for the two alternative indicators.
• As an alternative proxy for the external finance premium, the level of stock price
volatility perceived by market participants is considered. More specifically, I used
the conditional variance of stock prices, generated by a GARCH process. This mea-
sure of uncertainty is a key determinant of the risk premium required by investors
to hold shares instead of deposits, and therefore indicative of the external finance
premium. At the same time, a serious drawback of this measure is that it is directly
derived from the same variable (equity prices) that is used to generate the equity
bust dummy. In most equations, however, including stock price volatility instead of
the interest rate spread leads to the same conclusions.
• The extended analysis (Table 4.2) was re-estimated with alternative baseline equa-
tions, including gross domestic product and the short-term interest rate instead of
industrial production and the long-term interest rate, and including the oil price. In
addition, I experimented with different lag structures. Neither of these alternatives
had much impact on the results.
• I analysed smaller subsamples, in particular the periods 1970-1980 and 1990-2002.
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In general, this leads to stronger differences between periods. Recursive estimations
also confirm the finding that financial variables have become more important over
time.
4.5 Concluding remarks
The results are in line with a financial accelerator mechanism in the post-1986 period.
Probably, the growing importance of the financial accelerator over time is due to the rapid
development of financial markets. Comparing stock market performance in the 1970s and
in recent years, Davis (2003) draws a similar conclusion. More specifically, he concludes
that the 1970 busts were characterized by a sharp deterioration of fundamentals, while the
recent equity busts reflect the correction of overvaluation (i.e. a correction of an incorrect
perception of fundamentals).
The outcomes for the external finance premium and interest rates around equity busts
support the existence of downward pressure on policy interest rates after a downscaling
of long-term growth prospects in an environment with strong financial accelerator effects.
Expansionary monetary policy in reaction to busts has been the typical reaction in the
recent period, but not in the 1970s and early 1980s.
In 2007, the world economy had witnessed several years of strong economic growth, at
unprecedented levels since the early 1970s. In those years, optimism had boosted credit
growth in many countries. In 2007, shocks to the US subprime mortgage market triggered
the downward revision of economic prospects, and risks around the central projections
have come to the fore. This has undermined collateral values and driven up premiums and
market interest rates from levels that are very low by historical standards. High market
interest rates exacerbate the initial downward economic shocks. This puts pressure on
monetary authorities to reduce policy interest rates, in many cases from low levels at the
outset.
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4.6 Appendices
4.6.1 Appendix A: data
Most data are taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (IFS), extended by
various other (mostly national) sources. Table 4.3 gives an overview of data availability
for each country in our sample.
• Real activity and prices. Real Gross Domestic Product, Industrial Production and
Investment (Gross Capital Formation) are included as measures for real activity.
Inflation is based on the consumer price index.
• Money and credit markets. The short-term interest rate is a (mostly three-month
or overnight) market interest rate, and the long-term interest rate is in most cases
the ten-year government bond yield. The interest rate spread proxy for the external
finance premium is the difference between the interest rates of long-term private
debt and government bonds. For most countries, private-sector interest rates are
based on corporate bonds, taken from Globalfindata. Obviously, several character-
istics, such as the average maturity, are likely to differ between corporate bonds
and government bonds and across countries. Therefore, this measure for the risk
premium may also capture a yield curve effect. However, because the direction of
this effect varies across countries, its aggregate impact on the results is probably
limited. Furthermore, the yield curve itself (measured by difference between long-
term and short-term interest rates) has no significant explanatory power in most
of our estimations. The alternative proxy for the external finance premium, the
conditional volatility of stock prices, is calculated with a GARCH(1,1) model. M3
and credit data from the IFS are extended by data from many other sources.
• Asset markets and financial crises. Most stock prices are taken from the IFS, while
house prices are based on various national sources and mostly taken from the BIS
Datase. An episode is considered a banking crisis if it qualifies as such according to
either Bordo et al. (2001) or Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999).
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GDP IP I π rS rL rspread M3 CR S H
Australia 65 -02 65-02 65-02 65-02 68-02 65-02 83-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 70-02
Austria 65 -02 65-02 88-02 65-02 65-02 70-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 87-99
Belgium 80-02 65-02 80-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 69-98 65-02 65-02 70-02
Canada 65 -02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 68-02 65-02 65-02 70-02
Denmark 70 -00 68-02 88-02 65-02 71-02 65-02 71-02 68-02 65-02 65-02 70-02
Finland 75 -02 65-02 75-02 65-02 78-02 78-02 — 75-99 65-02 65-02 70-02
France 70 -02 65-02 78-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-98 65-02 65-02 70-02
Germany 65-02 65-02 91-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 71-99
Italy 65 -02 65-02 70-02 65-02 71-02 65-02 71-02 80-02 70-98 65-02 72-01
Japan 65 -02 65-02 80-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 70-01
Korea 70 -02 70-02 70-02 70-02 76-02 73-02 76-02 65-02 65-02 78-01 —
Netherlands 65 -02 65-02 77-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 70-98 65-98 65-02 65-02 70-02
New Zealand 70 -01 77-02 70-02 65-02 73-02 65-02 — 71-02 65-02 65-00 70-02
Norway 65 -02 65-02 78-02 65-02 71-02 65-02 83-02 65-02 65-02 65-00 70-02
Portugal 77 -02 68-02 86-02 65-02 82-02 65-02 — 80-02 65-02 88-02 88-02
Spain 65 -02 65-02 80-02 65-02 74-02 78-02 74-02 65-02 65-98 70-00 75-02
Sweden 70 -02 65-02 70-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 70-00 65-02 70-01
Switzerland 65 -02 65-02 70-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 72-02 65-02 65-02 70-02
United Kingdom 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 82-02 65-02 65-02 68-02
United States 65 -02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 70-02 65-02 65-02 65-02 70-02
GDP = real gross domestic product
IP = industrial production
I = investment
π = inflation
rS = short-term interest rate
rL = long-term interest rate
rspread = spread
M3 = M3 growth
CR = credit growth
S = stock prices
H = house prices
Table 4.3: Data used
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4.6.2 Appendix B: equity busts
The busts presented in Table 4.4 are calculated using the methodology explained in Section
3.
Equity busts Equity busts
Australia 1972Q2-1977Q 1 Netherlands 2000Q1-
Austria 1990Q4-1992Q 3 New Zealand 1973Q3-1977Q4
Belgium 1974Q1-1977Q 3 1987Q2-1991Q2
Canada 2001Q1- Norway 1974Q1-1979Q1
Denmark 1977Q4-1980Q 3 Portugal 1986Q2-1989Q2
1989Q4-1993Q3
Finland 1973Q4-1979Q 2 2000Q2-
1988Q4-1993Q 1 Spain 1973Q3-1981Q2
2002Q2-2001Q 1 Sweden 1990Q1-1993Q1
France 1974Q2-1977Q 2 2000Q2-
2000Q3- Switzerland 1972Q1-1976Q3
Germany 2000Q1- 2000Q3-
Italy 1973Q1-1979Q 1 United Kingdom 1971Q4-1977Q1
1990Q1-1993Q 2 2000Q3-
2000Q3- United States 1972Q3-1975Q2
Japan 1989Q4-1993Q 3 2000Q3-
2000Q3-
Korea 1976Q2-1982Q 4
1989Q4-1993Q 2
1995Q1-1999Q 2
Table 4.4: Equity busts
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4.6.3 Appendix C: cross-correlations
rS rL π IP GDP I M3 CR rspread S H
rS 1.00
rL 0.82 1.00
π 0.78 0.55 1.00
IP -0.22 -0.19 -0.34 1.00
GDP -0.24 -0.12 -0.38 0.89 1.00
I -0.24 -0.23 -0.31 0.80 0.80 1.00
M3 -0.34 -0.30 -0.51 0.33 0.45 0.51 1.00
CR -0.36 -0.30 -0.58 0.60 0.69 0.72 0.88 1.00
rspread -0.07 0.01 -0.09 -0.68 -0.61 -0.57 0.18 -0.68 1.00
S -0.26 -0.13 -0.52 0.21 0.32 0.12 0.22 0.21 -0.12 1.00
H -0.44 -0.52 -0.51 0.45 0.54 0.58 0.74 0.45 -0.12 0.16 1.00
Table 4.5: Cross-correlations
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Chapter 5
Zero lower bound worries
”There is no trap so deadly as the trap you set for yourself.”
(Raymond Chandler)
5.1 Introduction
Central banks tend to avoid reducing policy interest rates to very low levels.1 They prefer
a safety margin above the zero lower bound, where further monetary policy expansion by
reducing interest rates is ruled out. Nonetheless, the Bank of Japan has kept the policy
interest rate at or very close to the zero lower bound since 1999. Also the central banks of
the US, the euro area and Switzerland lowered policy interest rates to unprecedented levels
in the early 2000s. These developments have triggered a debate on whether monetary
policy really is impotent at the zero bound, as most stylized macro-economic models
suggest. Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) argue that unorthodox policies will allow further
monetary expansion when policy interest rates cannot be reduced further.
Central banks’ aversion to very low interest rates may influence the way it conducts
monetary policy. I investigate how a central bank should set policy under the assumption
that hitting the zero lower bound exhausts the monetary policy expansion possibilities.
This influences the choice of the level of the inflation target, which preceeds deciding on
the level of the interest rate on a daily basis. The analysis is done in a New-Keynesian
framework along the lines of Clarida et al. (1999), which is today’s workhorse model for
examining monetary policy issues. I incorporate an explicit zero lower bound restriction
1This chapter is a revised version of Ullersma and Hieminga (2006).
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on the nominal interest rate. The focus is on a one-off demand shock instead of stochastic
shocks, since shocks that bring about a binding zero lower bound are likely to be uncom-
mon events (Jung et al., 2005). Because of the one-off character of the shock I only solve
for optimal monetary policy under discretion. Considering the commitment case would
be artificial in a deterministic world.
This introduction is followed by a presentation of the model in Section 2. Section 3
shows how the optimal level of the inflation target is determined. In Section 4 optimal
monetary policy reactions to a demand shock are shown. Section 5 concludes.
5.2 Model
In the standard New-Keynesian set-up the central bank minimizes a loss function condi-
tional on the specification of the economy. The loss function L at time t is:
Lt = Et
{ ∞∑
j=0
βj
[
αx2t+j + (πt+j − π∗)2
]}
, (5.1)
where x is the output gap, π is the inflation rate, α (≥ 0) is the weight on the output gap,
β is the discount factor, and ∗ refers to a policy target level. The central bank tries to
close the output gap (x∗ = 0) and to stabilize inflation around π∗.
The demand side is represented by a linear approximation of the household’s Euler
equation for optimal consumption. This expectational IS curve is:
xt = Etxt+1 − ϕ (it − Etπt+1 − rnt ) , (5.2)
where ϕ > 0, r is the real interest rate (rt = it−Etπt+1), rn is the natural rate of interest,
i.e. the real rate of interest that is compatible with a flexible price solution (absence of
nominal price rigidities). rn is determined exogenously and can deviate from its steady
state level, which is assumed to be non-negative. Changes in rn, for instance due to a
technology shock, can trigger fluctuations in output and inflation.
The supply side is derived under the assumption of monopolistic competition with
staggered price setting, which results in a Phillips curve:
πt − π = λxt + β (Etπt+1 − π) , (5.3)
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where λ > 0 and π refers to the steady state of the inflation level.
In deviation from the standard set-up, I follow Jung et al. (2005) and add an explicit
non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate:
it ≥ 0. (5.4)
The nominal interest rate cannot be reduced below zero, since a negative nominal interest
rate would make zero-interest bearing currency a superior investment to holding short-
term bonds. The jury is still out on whether the zero lower bound poses an obstacle to
monetary policy effectiveness. According to Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) the central
bank has alternative means of providing monetary stimulus when the zero bound is bind-
ing, such as increasing the size of the central bank balance sheet beyond what is needed
to set the nominal interest rate at zero.
With an explicit zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, the inflation target π∗
becomes relevant, since higher average levels of the nominal interest rate relax the zero
bound restriction (it = rt + πt). Therefore, the inflation target level is not set at 0, as is
common practice, but is determined separately below.
Since there is no disturbance term in the Phillips curve, there is no trade-off between
the output and inflation target of the central bank.2 Without loss of generality I set
α = 0. A clear focus on price stability is in line with current practice at the European
Central Bank and at inflation targeting central banks such as the Bank of England.
5.3 Inflation target
Before the central bank starts minimizing the loss function, the level of the inflation
target must be determined. The inflation target is set at the optimal level of steady state
inflation.
If inflation is anticipated by economic agents, they can take it into account when
making decisions. Therefore, expected inflation is less costly than unexpected inflation
2The absence of a disturbance term rests on the assumption of a proportionate relationship between
marginal costs and the output gap. If this assumption is relaxed, a ’cost push’ shock could also result in
a binding zero lower bound. Such a shock is less interesting than a demand shock, since a deflationary
cost push shock goes hand in hand with higher production than in the case of a demand shock. It would
not change the results of the analysis substantially.
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in terms of welfare. If anticipated inflation comes at zero costs and the zero bound is a
serious impediment to monetary policy, then the inflation target would be set sufficiently
high to completely circumvent the zero lower bound constraint. The higher the inflation
target is set, the lower is the risk of hitting the zero lower bound. This outcome would
also result when downward nominal rigidities on nominal wages is the only relevant factor
in the determination for the inflation target. Akerlof et al. (1996) have underlined the
desirability to allow for real wage declines without nominal wage cuts. Since the zero
lower bound restriction is irrelevant for the high level of inflation that is chosen as target
(πH), the steady state is characterised by: π = πH , x = 0, i = rn+πH . This is the optimal
outcome, since the value of the central bank’s loss function L is zero.
The traditional discussion on the optimal level of the inflation rate (see Friedman,
1969) focuses on the (private) opportunity cost of holding non-interest bearing money,
which is the nominal interest rate. Inflation can be regarded as a tax on holding cash
balances when the nominal interest rate is positive. Private agents have to make so-called
shoe leather costs to keep cash balances at an efficient level. The private opportunity
cost of holding money should equal the social marginal cost of printing money, which is
practically zero. Therefore the steady state level of the nominal interest should be zero
(i = 0)3. This requires that π = −rn < 0. The output gap of this corner solution steady
state (Friedman equilibrium) can be derived by substitution: x = − (1− β) λ−1 (rn + π) .
With positive (rn + π) the steady state is characterised by deflation and output below
potential.
In the new-Keynesian framework without a zero bound on nominal interest rates, the
optimal inflation level is 0. This is because nominal price rigidities prevent continuous
reoptimization of prices (Calvo-style pricing). Instability of the price level would result
in distortions in relative prices. This argument in favour of price level stability is closely
related to traditional pleas for zero inflation because of menu costs associated with chang-
ing prices or costs due to incomplete indexation of prices.4 The steady state solution is:
π = 0, x = 0, i = rn.
Since there is a trade-off between the different aims, the decision on the optimal level
3Here, I refer to the steady state as i instead of i to indicate it is a corner solution. The interior
solution (π, x = 0 and i = rn + π > 0) cannot be reached because of the restriction i ≥ 0.
4 I abstract from measurement errors. It has been argued that official inflation numbers overstate
actual inflation, for instance due to quality improvements.
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involves an optimizing problem on its own. It is a one-off problem, since the target will
be fixed over an extended period of time. Actual inflation outcomes will involve limited
deviations from the inflation target, because the target equals the steady state inflation
level. The optimization problem involves minimizing a loss function L∗ :
L∗ = −γ1π∗ + γ2 (π∗ + rn)2 + γ3 (π∗)2 , (5.5)
where γ1 reflects the costs associated with the zero lower bound, γ2 is linked to shoe-
leather costs, and γ3 is connected to costs associated with deviations from price level
stability. Minimizing this eq. leads to:
π∗ =
1
2 (γ2 + γ3)
(γ1 − 2γ2rn) . (5.6)
If the zero lower bound constraint is the only factor that matters (γ2, γ3 = 0; γ1 > 0) the
inflation target is indefinitely high. If the Friedman target prevails (γ1, γ3 = 0;γ2 > 0),
then π∗ = −rn. If γ1, γ2 = 0, γ3 > 0, then π∗ = 0. Usually, γ2 is close to zero since the
Friedman distortion is small in comparison to other rigidities. γ3 is large under normal
circumstances since nominal rigidities work out much more distortionary when the price
level is changing substantially. High aversion to hitting the zero lower bound (high value
of γ1) makes sense in an environment where shocks to the natural interest rate cause
strong fluctuations in the optimal nominal policy interest rate, and where the possibilities
for monetary policy expansion are exhausted at the zero bound.
5.4 Day-to-day interest rate setting
It cannot be ruled out completely that a large shock forces the central bank to lower the
interest rate to its lower bound. I examine a situation with a positive inflation target,
where the zero lower bound does not bite in the steady state. Following Jung et al. (2005)
I consider a one-off large-scale negative demand shock that leads to a large negative value
of the real natural rate of interest at period t. It is assumed to gradually converge to its
steady state level in later periods:
rnt+j = ρ
t+jεnj + r
n for j = 0, ..., (5.7)
where 0 ≤ ρ < 1.
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Given the inflation target that was determined before the shock occured, the central
bank chooses a time path for the instrument i to steer x and π in order to minimize the
loss function eq. 5.1, subject to the constraints implied by eqs. 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4. I solve
this problem under discretion, where it is assumed that the central bank takes private
sector expectations as given. The central bank and the public play a one-shot game
without private information. The optimisation problem is described by a Lagrangian
that takes on board the loss function and the IS and Phillips Curve constraints, as well
as the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate:
Zt =
∑∞
j=0
βj
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(πt+j − π∗)2
+2Λ1,t+j
(
xt+j − xt+j+1 + ϕ
(
it+j − πt+j+1 − rnt+j
))
+2Λ2,t+j (πt+j − λxt+j − βπt+j+1)
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ , (5.8)
it+j ≥ 0, (5.9)
where Λ represents a Lagrange multiplier. The first order condition to this problem defines
the central bank’s reaction function:
πt+j − π∗ + Λ2,t+j = 0, (5.10)
Λ1,t+j − λΛ2,t+j = 0, (5.11)
it+jΛ1,t+j = 0, (5.12)
it+j ≥ 0, (5.13)
Λ1,t+j ≥ 0. (5.14)
Given the large negative shock to the real natural interest rate that fades away gradually,
it can be guessed that the zero lower bound is binding until period T , but non-binding
afterwards. With Λ1,t+j = 0 for t + j > T the interior solution emerges: πt+j = π∗ =
π, xt+j = 0, it+j = r
n
t+j+π. For t+ j ≤ T, it+j = 0, πt+j+1 = β−1πt+j −β−1λxt+j+ β−1β π <
π∗, xt+j+1 = −ϕβ−1πt+j +
(
1 + ϕβ−1λ
)
xt+j − ϕrnt+j − ϕ
(
β−1
β
)
π. If monetary policy
expansion is still possible at the zero lower bound, for instance by increasing the size of
the central bank balance sheet beyond what is needed to set the nominal interest rate
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at zero, the zero bound poses no serious obstacle to monetary policy. In this situation
the non-negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate does no longer apply. i can
be regarded as a proxy for the monetary policy stance. Negative values signal strongly
expansionary policies. Without the non-negativity constraint, the central bank can set
the interest rate so that the real interest rate equals its natural level, implying zero losses.
5.5 Concluding remarks
Before a central bank determines the level of the monetary policy interest rate to maximise
welfare, it has to decide on the level of the inflation target. It will account for shoe leather
costs associated with (steady state) inflation levels deviating from minus the real rate of
interest, costs that emerge from price level instability in an environment with nominal
price rigidities, and the risk of hitting the zero lower bound at low steady state inflation
levels. If the zero lower bound poses a serious obstacle to monetary policy, the central
bank will choose a positive inflation target. Given this target, the central bank can follow
standard maximising techniques to determine the level of the nominal monetary policy
interest rate. This may imply keeping the nominal interest rate at the zero lower bound
for some time after a sharp negative shock to the real natural rate of interest has occured.
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Chapter 6
Money rules
”Xρη´ματα νευ˜ρα τω˜ν πραγμα´των”
(Aeschines)
6.1 Introduction
In recent years the New Keynesian model has emerged as the consensus model for mon-
etary policy analysis.1 It is well-known that money plays no crucial role in the standard
version of this model. The money demand function only identifies the amount of money
that the central bank will have to supply when it sets interest rates. At most, money
can function as a leading indicator of inflation or output for policy makers (Dotsey and
Hornstein, 2003).2 Several authors have argued that the standard New Keynesian model
does insufficient justice to the role of money in the monetary policy transmission process
(e.g. Meyer, 2001, and Nelson, 2003). Allowing for such a role for money in an otherwise
standard New Keynesian model could justify monetary policy makers devoting attention
to monetary developments. This motivates the main objective of this chapter, which is
to assess the welfare implications of including money in the monetary policy rule. The
issue is also of practical relevance since the European Central Bank explicitly attaches
a prominent role to money in its monetary policy strategy, in contrast to other major
central banks (ECB, 2003).
Two different approaches that allow for a distinct role for money are assessed: by
1This chapter is a revised version of Ullersma, Berk and Chapple (2006).
2Gerlach and Svensson (2003) find the same using a P* model.
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incorporating a real balance effect in the aggregate demand function and by interpreting
money as a proxy for yields that matter for aggregate demand in addition to the short-term
interest rate. In contrast to Andrés et al. (2007) the optimal monetary policy reactions to
shocks are derived, under both discretion and commitment from a timeless perspective.
This allows for the assessment of the welfare gains of taking money explicitly into account
in setting monetary policy. The following section describes the model. Section 3 discusses
the effects of different policy settings on the response to economic shocks. Section 4
concludes.
6.2 Model
The model is an extension of the New Keynesian model that is today’s consensus macro-
economic model for monetary policy analysis (Clarida et al., 1999). An attractive feature
of the standard New Keynesian model is that the aggregate behavioral equations can be
derived from intertemporal optimization by rational economic agents (e.g. Yun, 1996).
However, a drawback is that it summarizes overall financial conditions in one interest
rate, which is a gross simplification of the monetary policy transmission process (Mishkin,
1996). To overcome this drawback, two different perspectives that provide a theoretical
rationale for a separate role for money are assessed. The modified forward-looking New
Keynesian model that allows for a distinct role for money from both of these perspectives
is based on a representative household that maximizes utility:
maxE0
∞∑
t=0
βtat
[
Ψ
(
Ct,
Mt
Pt
)
− N
1+ϕ
t
1 + ϕ
]
−G
(
Mt
Pt
Mt−1
Pt−1
)
, (6.1)
G
(
Mt
Pt
Mt−1
Pt−1
)
=
d
2
{
exp
(
c
{
Mt
Pt
Mt−1
Pt−1
− 1
})
+ exp
(
−c
{
Mt
Pt
Mt−1
Pt−1
− 1
})
− 2
}
, (6.2)
where Ct is a CES aggregator of the quantities of the different goods consumed, MtPt
represents real balances (withMt broad money and Pt the price level), Nt represents hours
worked, at is a preference shock, β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor, G
(
Mt
Pt
Mt−1
Pt−1
)
represents
portfolio adjustment costs, and d > 0, c > 0. This utility function diverges in two
respects from a standard representation. First, for analytical convenience many authors
assume separability in preferences among consumption and real balances. By relaxing
this assumption, the link between consumption/output and real balances/money gets
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tighter. With utility non-separable in consumption and real balances, money is regarded
as wealth in its own right by consumers. Second, following Andrés et al. (2007) portfolio
adjustment costs are added. Other things equal, the G function implies that households
have a preference to maintain the amount of purchasing power they hold in the form of
real money balances relatively stable over time. Recall that the traditional representation,
without adjustment costs, allows for just two asset categories: money and bonds. In
reality, many varieties of assets can be distinguished. It is not feasible to insert all these
asset categories in the utility function. Instead, portfolio adjustment costs in real balances
can cover the role played by yields beyond the short-term interest rate. This is because
money demand is not only a function of its own rate of return, but also of the rate of return
of alternative assets. Therefore, money demand, like aggregate demand, is a function of
a wide range of interest rates. If real money balances increase, they offer higher liquidity
services, which lower risk premia on financial assets that are less liquid than money. The
modified New Keynesian model that results from standard optimizing procedures can be
specified in deviations from the steady state as follows (Andrés et al., 2006, 2007):
xt = xt+1|t − σ
(
it − πt+1|t
)
+ α
(
mt −mt+1|t
)
+ εxt , (6.3)
εxt = ρxε
x
t−1 + u
x
t , (6.4)
πt = ωπt+1|t + λmct, (6.5)
mct = κxt − α
σ
mt, (6.6)
mt = β1xt − β2it + β3mt−1 + β3ωmt+1|t + εmt , (6.7)
εmt = ρmε
m
t−1 + u
m
t , (6.8)
where xt is the output gap (log deviation of output from its steady state level) at time t,
and xt+1|t the value of x at time t+1, expected at time t. it is the nominal interest rate,
πt the inflation rate, mt = MtPt , mct real marginal costs, ε
x
t an AR(1) demand shock, ε
m
t
an AR(1) money shock and ut a white noise disturbance term. If money is regarded as
wealth by consumers, the marginal utility of consumption depends upon real balances,
and higher real balances increase demand. In equation 6.3 this is the case if α > 0,
see also Ireland (2004) and Andrés et al. (2006). Otherwise, equation 6.3 is a regular
forward-looking IS curve, with the level of output depending on the real interest rate.
Equation 6.5 is a regular New Keynesian Phillips curve. It allows for sticky prices in the
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short term and fully flexible prices in the long run. Equation 6.6 shows that there is no
longer a one-to-one relationship between real marginal costs and the output gap if there is
a real balance effect. Ireland (2004) demonstrates that cross restrictions in the underlying
micro structure generate a direct effect of money on marginal costs. This implies that
money affects the supply side if it is incorporated in the demand side (equation 6.3).
Intuitively, higher real money is an input factor that offers liquidity services and reduces
capacity constraints that stem from the output gap conditions. Equation 6.7 is a standard
money demand equation, except that past and expected future real balances can enter
the money demand function. Given portfolio adjustment costs (i.e. β3 > 0), money is no
longer a static indicator of current economic conditions. Instead, real money balances are
changed in anticipation of expected future conditions. This makes current real balances
a function of expected future real balances. Rewriting equation 6.7 clarifies that current
real balances depend on expected future output and interest rate levels. Therefore, real
balances are informative on current and future levels of the natural rate of interest, which
is the equilibrium real interest rate in the absence of nominal rigidities (Nelson, 2003).
Andrés et al. (2007) show that the forward-looking nature of money demand can allow
for a very accurate estimation of the natural real interest rate. In sum, if α > 0 the real
balance channel operates, while if β3 > 0 the portfolio adjustment channel, where money
serves as a proxy for a variety of yields, comes into play. When both α = 0 and β3 = 0
the model reduces to the standard New Keynesian macro-economic model.
6.3 Transmission of shocks
The transmission of shocks is compared under different (quasi) optimal monetary policy
rules. This involves minimizing the expected value of the policy maker’s loss function:
Losst = Et
∞∑
j=0
ωj
(
π2t+j + γx
2
t+j
)
, (6.9)
with respect to the nominal short-term interest rate it, which is the monetary policy in-
strument, subject to the economic structure represented in equations 6.3-6.8. For clarity
of exposition a sharp distinction between the conventional interest rate transmission chan-
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nel and the real balance channel is assumed by setting β2 = 0.
3 The reader should have
a broad concept of money, such as M3, in mind, because money is regarded as a financial
asset along with alternative assets. A low interest elasticity of money demand is consistent
with a broad money concept, where an interest rate change leads to substitution between
different components of the money stock in addition to substitution between money and
other assets. Empirical evidence confirms this finding (Bruggeman et al., 2003).
6.3.1 Real balance effects
Consider the real balance variant of the model (α > 0, β2 = 0, β3 = 0). By substituting
equation 6.7 in equation 6.3 and equations 6.6 and 6.7 in equation 3.16 the IS and Phillips
curve functions can be rewritten as:
xt = xt+1|t − σ
1− αβ1
(
it − πt+1|t
)
+
1
1− αβ1
εxt +
α
1− αβ1
εmt , (6.10)
πt = ωπt+1|t + λ
(
κ− α
σ
β1
)
xt − λα
σ
εmt . (6.11)
It is assumed that the policy maker can observe money shocks contemporaneously. Then,
the money shocks should be in the information set that determines the monetary author-
ity’s policy setting. First, the minimization problem is solved under discretion, where the
monetary authority acts each period without limiting future policy options. This can be
regarded as a representation of a central bank that wants to have full flexibility in reacting
to shocks. The optimality condition under discretion is (Clarida et al., 1999 and Walsh,
2003):
Et {xt|Ωt} = −λ (κσ − αβ1)
σγ
Et {πt|Ωt} , (6.12)
where Ωt is the monetary authority’s information set at the time it determines it. If
the monetary authority neglects the information on money shocks it will be surprised
by these shocks, and both inflation and output disturbances will be higher, since the εm
disturbances are neglected.
Second, the minimization problem is solved under commitment from a time-less per-
spective. Commitment means that the monetary authority can precommit to a policy
rule. Under a time-less perspective it is assumed that the current approach was followed
3Assuming σ = 0 would also imply a sharp distinction between both transmission channels. However,
this would lead to diverging solutions in equation 3.4 if α = 0, or in equation 6.6 if α > 0.
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from the distant past onwards. Commitment from a time-less perspective improves the
predictability of monetary policy and avoids time-inconsistent behaviour. This approach
represents state-of-the-art central bank behaviour. Under commitment from a time-less
perspective, the optimality conditions are (Walsh, 2003):
Et (πt+i|Ωt+i + Λt+i − Λt+i−1) = 0 i ≥ 0, (6.13)
Et
(
γxt+i|Ωt+i − λ
σ
(κσ − αβ1) Λt+i
)
= 0 i ≥ 0, (6.14)
where Λ is a Lagrangian multiplier. The time-less perspective implies that condition
6.13 also holds in the current period (i = 0). In this way, time inconsistency due to
the possibility of implementing policies that cannot affect prior expectations is avoided.
Again, money shocks εmt+i influence the model’s dynamics and should be in the information
set Ωt+i at time t+i.
Both for discretion and for commitment from a timeless perspective the optimal paths
for xt, πt and it can be derived. Figures 6.1-6.2 display the impulse responses when the
economy is hit by a money demand shock (εmt ), which generates positive real balance
effects. The parameter values are based on quarterly EMU data from Andrés et al.
(2006, 2007): σ = 1, α = 0.9, ρx = 0.5, ρm = 0.5, ω = 0.99, λ = 0.14, κ = 10, β1 =
0.2, β2 = 0, β3 = 0, γ = 0.25. The output and inflation patterns after a money shock are
shown, both when the policy maker takes money demand shocks explicitly into account
and when she disregards information on money demand shocks. If the policy maker does
not take the εmt -shocks into account when setting interest rates, output and inflation
deviations from steady state are higher than otherwise. The higher level of output and
inflation volatility in case of neglecting money implies lower welfare. Note that inflation
falls (marginally) below its steady state level when money shocks are taken into account.
This is because of the negative supply shock associated with εmt (see equation 6.11). If
money is neglected, this supply effect is dominated by the indirect influence of stronger
demand on inflation. Note also that the persistence of the deviations from the steady
state is higher under commitment from a time-less perspective than under discretion, as
one would expect. The initial deviation is the same, since commitment has no impact on
shocks that are not in the information set of the policy maker.
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Figure 6.1: Money shock (discretion)
6.3.2 Money as indicator of the natural rate of interest
Consider the alternative modification of the New Keynesian model where yields of financial
assets are proxied by money (α = 0, β3 > 0). As explained above, this approach offers an
accurate estimate of the real natural interest rate. I assume that this estimate is perfect,
and depart from the benchmark New Keynesian approach in which the real natural interest
rate is assumed to be constant. Galí (2003) shows that the real natural interest rate is:
rt = (1− ω) + φ∆at, (6.15)
where at is (log) productivity. Bars refer to natural levels. If an observed productivity
shock affects rt, optimal monetary policy ensures that the real interest rate rt
(
= it − πt+1|t
)
coincides with its natural value. On the other hand, if economic agents assume a constant
r, the IS equation 6.3 can be rewritten as:
xt = xt+1|t − σ
(
it − πt+1|t
)
+ σφεat , (6.16)
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Figure 6.2: Money shock (commitment from a time-less perspective)
where εat
(
= ρaε
a
t−1 + u
a
t
)
is a shock to ∆at. The optimality condition under discretion is
(Clarida et al., 1999 and Walsh, 2003):
Et {xt|Ωt} = −λκ
γ
Et {πt|Ωt} . (6.17)
Under commitment from a time-less perspective, the optimality conditions are (Walsh,
2003):
Et (πt+i|Ωt+i + Λt+i − Λt+i−1) = 0 i ≥ 0, (6.18)
Et (γxt+i|Ωt+i − λκΛt+i) = 0 i ≥ 0. (6.19)
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 display the impulse responses for the portfolio adjustment modification
of the model where α = 0, β3 = 0.4, ρa = 0.5, φ = 0.9 (other parameter values as in the
real balance version of the model) when the policy maker does not use money for the
determination of the real natural interest rate after a positive technology shock (εat ).
The increase in the real natural interest rate after the εat -shock implies a more expansive
monetary policy by decreasing the deviation of it from its natural rate. This drives up the
output gap. Again, commitment from a time-less perspective results in more persistent
6.4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 93
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Quarters
P
er
ce
n
t
output gap inflation rate
When money is not  used to determine the 
natural interest  rate
Figure 6.3: Technology shock (discretion)
deviations from steady state than discretion. When the policy maker does use money to
determine the real natural interest rate a technology shock will not cause disturbances
in output and inflation, since she will ensure that the real interest rate equals its natural
level. The deviations from steady state in the case when the policy maker disregards the
information on the natural interest rate imply a welfare loss, which is higher when the
natural interest rate fluctuates more.
6.4 Concluding remarks
In this chapter two modifications of the standard New Keynesian macro-economic model
are assessed that allow for a more complete representation of monetary policy transmis-
sion. Money can either have real balance effects or can indicate changes in the natural
interest rate. In the former case the monetary authority should take the direct impact of
money on demand and supply into account when setting monetary policy, in the latter
case she should take the implied changes in the monetary stance into account. If empirical
94 CHAPTER 6. MONEY RULES
0,0
0,2
0,4
0,6
0,8
1,0
1,2
1,4
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Quarters
P
er
ce
n
t
output gap inflation rate
When money is not  used to determine the 
natural interest rate
Figure 6.4: Technology shock (commitment from a time-less perspective)
evidence were to show that at least one of these channels is relevant, neglecting money in
setting monetary policy would imply a suboptimal outcome, i.e. incur welfare losses.
6.5 Appendix
6.5.1 Real balance effects: discretion
Following a εm-shock, the pattern for xt and πt consistent with equation 6.12, assuming
that the policy maker uses all available information, is (compare Walsh, 2003):
xt =
λ∗
(λ∗)2 + γ (1− ωρm)
λα
σ
εmt , (6.20)
πt =
−γ
(λ∗)2 + γ (1− ωρm)
λα
σ
εmt , (6.21)
where λ∗ = λ
(
κ− α
σ
β1
)
. it can be determined on the basis of IS equation 6.10.
If money is not in the information set of the monetary authority, the pattern for xt
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and πt is (compare Clarida et al., 1999):
xIt =
α
1− αβ1
εmt , (6.22)
πIt =
−λα
σ
εmt + λ
∗ α
1− αβ1
εmt , (6.23)
where the superscript I refers to equilibrium values under imperfect information.
6.5.2 Real balance effects: commitment from a time-less per-
spective
If money is in the information set, combining equations 6.5, 6.13, 6.14 and 6.15 yields
(compare Walsh, 2003):(
1 + ω +
(λ∗)2
γ
)
Et {xt|Ωt} = ωxt+1|t + xt−1 + λ
∗
γ
λα
σ
εmt . (6.24)
The solution to this expectational difference equation for the output gap is of the form:
Et {xt|Ωt} = axxt−1 − bx × λα
σ
εmt , (6.25)
where ax is the solution less than 1 of the quadratic equation:
ωa2x −
(
1 + ω +
(λ∗)2
γ
)
ax + 1 = 0, (6.26)
bx = −
(
λ∗
γ (1 + ω (1− ρm − ax)) + (λ∗)2
)
. (6.27)
It follows that:
Et {πt|Ωt} = γ
λ∗
(1− αx)xt−1 − γ
γ (1 + ω (1− ρm − ax)) + (λ∗)2
λα
σ
εmt . (6.28)
If money is not in the information set (Clarida et al., 1999):
xIt = axxt−1 +
α
1− αβ1
εmt , (6.29)
πIt =
γ
λ∗
(1− αx) xIt−1 −
λα
σ
εmt + λ
∗ α
1− αβ1
εmt . (6.30)
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6.5.3 Money as indicator for the natural rate of interest
If money is not used for determining the natural rate of the interest rate, the output shock
will come as a surprise. Then, the optimal monetary policy under discretion implies:
xt = σφε
a
t , (6.31)
πt = λκσφε
a
t . (6.32)
Under commitment from a timeless perspective:
xt = axxt−1 + σφεat , (6.33)
πt =
γ
λκ
(1− αx)xt−1 + λκσφεat , (6.34)
where ax is the solution less than 1 of the quadratic equation:
ωa2x −
(
1 + ω +
(λκ)2
γ
)
ax + 1 = 0. (6.35)
Chapter 7
Summary and conclusions
The Western world has reached a situation with low and stable consumer price inflation.
To central bankers this sounds as though they have reached the promised land, since
safeguarding the purchasing power of money (price stability) is their overarching objective.
To others it may just be a sign that macro-economic stability is higher than in the last
decades. Nonetheless, problems can arise.
First, in an environment with low and stable inflation, the room for manoeuvre for
monetary policy is smaller than in an environment with higher inflation. With price sta-
bility, central banks can get into a situation where they can no longer reduce the inflation-
adjusted monetary policy interest rate, which is their main instrument to boost economic
activity. The point is that average nominal interest rates, which include compensation for
inflation, are lower than in an environment with higher inflation. Low interest rates may
pose an obstacle to stimulatory monetary policy, since the nominal interest rate cannot
fall below zero, due to the availability of currency with a zero yield. Currency would offer
a superior alternative to investors in comparison to bonds with a negative yield.
Second, in a low and stable inflation environment, boom-bust cycles in asset prices
may arise. One factor is that stable macro-economic conditions are conducive to the
accumulation of financial wealth. At the same time, the valuation of assets is sensitive
to interest rate changes, in particular at low nominal interest rate levels. Therefore,
these changes can have a strong impact on the real economy. Another factor is that
in an environment with price stability, unsustainable economic expansion may not lead
to strong inflationary pressures due to high central bank credibility anchoring inflation
expectations. Without a firm basis for determining long-term growth prospects, people
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tend to extrapolate current real economic growth numbers into the future, in particular
when the economy does not show obvious signs of overheating. In such an environment,
where optimism prevails, growth in credit and asset prices can be expected to be high. This
is even more likely when financial liberalization has eased the access to credit. However,
eventually investors will observe that asset prices have moved out of line with economic
fundamentals. Then, they will downscale their expectations and reprice asset prices -
the bust phase. This leads to a repricing of risks, higher market interest rates and lower
economic activity.
This thesis brings together the phenomenon of the zero lower bound and the phenom-
enon of boom-bust cycles in asset prices. A recurrent theme is that monetary policy can
reach the zero lower bound to nominal interest rates in a low inflation environment after
the collapse of an asset price boom.
Chapter 2 is a survey of what characterises an economy in a zero lower bound, and
how it can escape from such a situation. This chapter shows that a weakness in the
general level of confidence is a crucial factor. This is because expectations drive agents’
behaviour, in particular spending. Without confidence, monetary easing leads to hoarding
instead of spending. The level of confidence influences not only demand, but also supply.
This is seen clearly when financial markets, which bring together creditors and debtors,
no longer run smoothly. Risk premiums are driven up, lifting market interest rates and
reducing demand. Supply is affected when financial market intermediation is interrupted,
for instance when banks go bust. Both the demand and supply factors depress the policy
interest rate, in severe cases pushing it to the zero lower bound. The survey demonstrates
that the issue of how a binding zero lower bound arises has received little attention to
date.
Chapter 3 elaborates, in a theoretical model, on the findings in Chapter 2. It shows
analytically how a binding zero lower bound can emerge from a correction of overopti-
mistic expectations. Since the price of an asset is the present discounted value of the
future expected income stream, a downward correction of the outlook for productivity
and income growth drives down net wealth. This is what happened, for example, after
the excessive optimism of the so-called New Economy in the late 1990s. Lower net wealth
implies that the value of collateral declines, making lending more risky. This translates
into a higher risk premium on the risk-free interest rate, depressing economic activity and
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consumer price inflation. In line with the decline in productivity growth the inflation-
adjusted policy interest rate at which economic activity is neither boosted nor contracted
(neutral interest rate) falls. Therefore, a sharp reduction in the (risk-free) policy interest
rate is required to boost the economy. In this environment, the central bank may have to
reduce its policy interest rate to the zero lower bound.
Chapter 4 is the empirical counterpart of Chapter 3. It presents new empirical evi-
dence on the macro-economic financial accelerator effects that play a crucial role in the
amplification of shocks in the preceding chapter. It confirms that unsustainable asset
booms, which are followed by asset busts, also occur in times of low and stable inflation.
The explanatory power of financial factors appears to be high in the post 1986 period, but
not in the period 1970-1986. In essence, asset booms and busts used to be by-products
of inflationary cycles. In the post 1986 period, they have become catalysts of economic
events. These results suggest that the financial accelerator mechanism played a role in the
latter period, when financial markets had grown larger and more sophisticated. In this
environment, the typical bust is followed by a substantial reduction in the nominal policy
interest rate, as one would expect on the basis of Chapter 3. Taken together, Chapters 3
and 4 have two major implications for monetary policy. First, the emergence of financial
cycles as catalysts for economic activity and inflation suggests that the policy horizon of
monetary authorities must be long enough to take these effects into consideration. Since
financial imbalances can take a long time to accumulate, the policy horizon sufficient to
deal with these issues may stretch over several years. Second, since it is very difficult to
detect financial imbalances and to foresee their collapse, monetary authorities would be
well advised to put emphasis on the analysis of uncertainties around central projections
in economic forecasts. This implies undertaking scenario analyses, and taking explicitly
into account the small probability of events with a high impact.
While the low inflation environment is taken as a starting position in Chapters 3 and
4, this assumption is relaxed in Chapter 5. Here, the choice of a higher inflation objective
(higher average inflation level) is studied as an alternative way to increase the room for
manoeuvre for monetary policy. The benefit of a smaller probability of facing a zero
lower bound problem is balanced against the costs associated with high average levels
of inflation. One of the main costs follows from the fact that prices tend to be sticky,
preventing the continuous reoptimization of prices by firms. An unstable price level
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would lead to distortions in relative prices, even without shocks hitting the economy. A
complication for monetary policy makers is that they cannot change the inflation objective
often, and that it is difficult to determine the risk of hitting the zero lower bound in the
remote future. Once they have chosen the inflation regime, they pursue price stability
given the objective for the rate of inflation. In exceptional circumstances, this could result
in reducing the nominal policy interest rate to zero.
Although the probability of reaching the binding zero lower bound appears likely to
be small, it is nevertheless greater than zero. It is an unresolved issue as to whether
a substantial monetary policy expansion remains still possible when monetary policy
interest rates cannot be reduced further. If the monetary policy interest rate can no longer
be used to stimulate the economy, increasing the money supply may still be effective. This
is because the money supply can influence the monetary stance, aside from its influence
on interest rates. Chapter 6 examines monetary policy in a theoretical model that allows
for such a role for money. In contrast to previous work by other authors, who use ad-hoc
monetary policy rules, optimal policy is investigated. It appears that overall welfare is
higher when the central bank takes money explicitly into account when setting interest
rates. First, increases in the money stock can boost aggregate demand through wealth
effects. This is because money is an asset to the public (real balances). At the same time,
money is a liability to the central bank, but with no consequences for its creditworthiness
due to its power to meet claims with newly created money. Second, increasing the money
stock lowers risk premiums on financial assets that are less liquid than money, since higher
market liquidity implies lower transaction costs. The latter effect shows that financial
market liquidity and liquidity as a yardstick for the monetary policy stance cannot be
separated completely. The emphasis on money aggregates in this chapter completes the
circle. Here, the focus is on the role money can still play when the monetary policy
interest rate cannot be reduced further. But money aggregates, and in particular their
credit counterparts, can also be indicative of risks associated with the build-up of financial
imbalances, as discussed in previous chapters.
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Samenvatting
(Summary in Dutch)
De economieën van de Westerse wereld zijn beland in een situatie met lage en stabiele
consumentenprijsinflatie. Centraal bankiers klinkt dit in de oren als het bereiken van
het beloofde land, aangezien stabiele koopkracht van het geld (prijsstabiliteit) hun hoofd-
doel is. Anderen beschouwen de huidige prijsstabiliteit wellicht als een teken dat de
macro-economische stabiliteit groter is dan in eerdere decennia. Ondanks deze positieve
associaties kent een klimaat met prijsstabiliteit specifieke complicaties.
Ten eerste is de manoeuvreerruimte voor het rentebeleid van de centrale bank in een
omgeving met lage en stabiele inflatie kleiner dan in een omgeving van hoge inflatie.
Lage inflatie impliceert dat de rentevoet, die ook een compensatie voor de verwachte
inflatie bevat, in doorsnee lager is dan in een inflatoir klimaat. Het probleem is dat de
centrale bank de monetaire beleidsrente slechts tot nul kan reduceren om de economie te
stimuleren. Lagere rentes zijn niet te bereiken, omdat beleggers altijd kunnen investeren in
beleggingstitel met een rendement van nul. Dat is immers het rendement dat bankbiljetten
(en munten) bieden.
Ten tweede kunnen in een omgeving van lage en stabiele consumentenprijsinflatie grote
schommelingen optreden in de prijzen van aandelen en andere vermogenstitels. Eén fac-
tor hierbij is dat stabiele macro-economische omstandigheden gunstig zijn voor de groei
van financieel vermogen. Tegelijkertijd is de financiële waardering van vermogenstitels
gevoelig voor renteveranderingen bij lage renteniveaus. Deze bewegingen in de vermo-
gensprijzen beïnvloeden de economische activiteit. Een andere factor is dat onhoudbare
economische expansie in een omgeving van lage en stabiele inflatie langdurig kan aan-
houden zonder dat de inflatie stijgt. Dit is het gevolg van groot publiek vertrouwen in
het vermogen van de centrale bank om een situatie van prijsstabiliteit te continueren.
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Bij gebrek aan signalen dat de economische groei onhoudbaar is, bestaat het gevaar dat
te rooskleurige verwachtingen over de economische groei op langere termijn postvatten.
Deze verwachtingen zullen zich uiten in onhoudbare koersontwikkelingen van vermogens-
titels en in hoge groei van de kredietverlening tijdens de zogeheten boom-fase. Dit is des
te waarschijnlijker wanneer financiële liberalisering de toegang tot kredietverlening heeft
verruimd. Uiteindelijk zal de economische ontwikkeling beleggers tot het inzicht brengen
dat de koersen niet in overeenstemming zijn met het onderliggende economische beeld.
Dit leidt tot forse koersdalingen tijdens de zogeheten bust-fase, en in het verlengde daar-
van een minder optimistische beoordeling van de aan kredietverlening verbonden risico’s,
opwaartse druk op marktrentevoeten en terugvallende economische activiteit.
Dit proefschrift brengt het verschijnsel van de nulvloer van de rente en het verschijnsel
van boom-bust cycli in vermogensprijzen met elkaar in verband. Een terugkerend thema
is dat de monetaire beleidsrente in een omgeving van lage inflatie de rentevloer kan raken
na een scherpe daling van vemogensprijzen.
Hoofdstuk 2 biedt een overzicht van de academische literatuur over de rentevloer.
Doorgaans heeft een economie die kampt met een nulrente te maken met een algeheel
gebrek aan vertrouwen. Vertrouwen speelt een centrale rol omdat economisch gedrag in het
algemeen, en bestedingsgedrag in het bijzonder, in belangrijke mate wordt gestuurd door
toekomstverwachtingen. Bij gebrek aan vertrouwen leidt versoepeling van het monetaire
beleid niet tot extra uitgaven, maar tot het oppotten van middelen. In de literatuur blijft
onderbelicht hoe (gebrek aan) vertrouwen een economie in een situatie met een nulrente
kan doen belanden, bijvoorbeeld wanneer een crisis op financiële markten optreedt. Niet
alleen wordt de marktrente dan opgedreven door hogere risicopremies, waardoor de vraag
naar goederen en diensten daalt, maar ook kan de productiecapaciteit dalen, bijvoorbeeld
wanneer banken failliet gaan. Zowel lagere bestedingen als lagere productiecapaciteit
vragen om reductie van de monetaire beleidsrente, waarbij de nulvloer van de rente geraakt
kan worden.
Hoofdstuk 3 borduurt in een theoretisch model voort op de belangrijkste bevindingen
in hoofdstuk 2. Het toont modelmatig aan hoe de centrale bank gedwongen kan worden
de rente tot nul te verlagen wanneer overoptimistische verwachtingen over het groeipo-
tentieel van de economie bijgesteld worden. Een reductie van de groeivooruitzichten leidt
tot lagere koersen van aandelen en andere vermogensbestanddelen, zoals zich bijvoorbeeld
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voordeed toen de groeiprestaties eind jaren ’90 achterbleven bij de verwachting van een
Nieuwe Economie. Vermogen wordt gebruikt als onderpand bij kredietverlening. Lagere
waardering van het onderpand maakt kredietverlening risicovoller en leidt daarom tot
een hogere risico-opslag (risicopremie) bovenop de risicovrije rentevoet, die de centrale
bank bepaalt. De stijging van de marktrente remt zowel de economische activiteit als
de inflatoire druk af. Omdat de initiële schok wordt versterkt door financiële factoren
spreekt men van een financieel acceleratormechanisme. Wegens de bijstelling van het
lange-termijn groeipotentieel van de economie daalt bovendien het niveau van de voor
de inflatie gecorrigeerde rente waarbij de economische activiteit noch gestimuleerd noch
afgeremd wordt (neutrale rente). De centrale bank zal de beleidsrente vervolgens aanzien-
lijk moeten verlagen om de economische activiteit op peil te houden en prijsstabiliteit te
handhaven. Hierbij kan de beleidsrente de nulvloer raken.
Hoofdstuk 4 bevat de uitkomsten van empirisch onderzoek naar financiële accelerator-
effecten die cruciaal zijn voor de versterking van schokken zoals beschreven in hoofdstuk
3. Een klimaat van prijsstabiliteit blijkt boom-bust cycli in vermogensprijzen niet te kun-
nen beletten. Anders dan in de jaren 1970-1986 geldt voor de jaren daarna dat financiële
factoren verklarende kracht hebben voor het optreden van scherpe neerwaartse correcties
in vermogensprijzen. De resultaten zijn consistent met het optreden van financiële accele-
ratormechanismen vanaf de tweede helft van de jaren ’80, toen financiële markten om-
vangrijker en geavanceerder werden dankzij liberalisatie. In dit klimaat wordt een reductie
in vermogensprijzen in de regel gevolgd door een substantiële daling in de beleidsrente, in
overeenstemming met de theoretische bevindingen in het voorgaande hoofdstuk. Hoofd-
stuk 3 en 4 tezamen suggereren dat de monetaire autoriteiten rekening moeten houden
met de accumulatie van financiële onevenwichtigheden, die zich over verscheidene jaren
kan uitstrekken. Dit vraagt om een beleidshorizon waarbij de centrale bank enkele jaren
vooruit kijkt. Aangezien het ondoenlijk is de omvang van financiële onevenwichtigheden
precies vast te stellen, en niemand het moment van de correctie kent, is het verstandig
scenario’s op te stellen waarbij ook aandacht wordt geschonken aan de kleine kans op
uitkomsten met ernstige gevolgen.
Terwijl hoofdstuk 3 en 4 uitgaan van een klimaat van lage en stabiele inflatie in de
uitgangssituatie, staat in hoofdstuk 5 juist de keuze van de inflatiedoelstelling van het
monetaire beleid centraal. Een hoger niveau van de inflatiedoelstelling mondt uit in
118 SAMENVATTING
hogere (nominale) rentevoeten en biedt de centrale bank dus meer manoeuvreerruimte
om de rente te verlagen. Dit voordeel moet de centrale bank afwegen tegen de aan
gemiddeld hogere inflatie verbonden kosten. Die kosten vloeien onder andere voort uit
het feit dat bedrijven hun prijzen niet voortdurend kunnen aanpassen. Dergelijke prijs-
rigiditeiten brengen met zich mee dat inflatie gepaard zou gaan met prijsdistorties, zelfs
wanneer er zich geen economische schok zou voordoen. In haar afweging wordt de cen-
trale bank geconfronteerd met de complicatie dat zij de inflatiedoelstelling voor lange tijd
moet vastleggen, terwijl het gevaar op toekomstige schokken die omvangrijke monetaire
versoepeling noodzakelijk maken slecht te beoordelen valt. Wanneer het inflatieregime
eenmaal vastligt, kan de centrale bank slechts zo goed mogelijk beleid voeren gegeven
dit uitgangspunt. In uitzonderlijke omstandigheden kan dat uitmonden in een monetaire
beleidsrente van nul.
De constatering dat een situatie met een monetaire beleidsrente van nul niet kan wor-
den uitgesloten, roept de vraag op of daarmee alle instrumenten voor monetaire stimu-
lering zijn uitgeput. Een mogelijkheid is dat verruiming van de geldhoeveelheid effecten
heeft los van haar invloed op de monetaire beleidsrente. Ten eerste genereert een hogere
geldhoeveelheid zogeheten vermogenseffecten. Particulieren ervaren een hogere geldhoe-
veelheid als vermogensgroei, op basis waarvan zij hun bestedingen verhogen. Weliswaar
betekent een hogere geldhoeveelheid ook dat de verplichtingen van de centrale bank toene-
men, maar hierdoor wordt haar kredietwaardigheid niet aangetast wegens haar vermogen
tot geldschepping. Ten tweede leidt een hogere geldhoeveelheid tot betere verhandel-
baarheid van vermogenstitels met een lagere liquiditeit dan geld. Daardoor kan de risico-
premie voor het aanhouden ervan dalen. Monetair beleid is dan niet alleen bepalend voor
de risicovrije rentevoet, maar heeft ook invloed op de risicocomponent van marktrentes.
In hoofdstuk 6 blijkt monetair beleid dat rekening houdt met dergelijke effecten tot betere
uitkomsten te leiden. De nadruk op de geldhoeveelheid in hoofdstuk 6 sluit de cirkel. Hier
ligt de nadruk op de rol die verruiming van de geldhoeveelheid nog kan hebben als het
rente-instrument is uitgeput. De geldhoeveelheid, en de daaraan gerelateerde kredietver-
lening, kan ook bepalend zijn voor de accumulatie van financiële onevenwichtigheden,
zoals aan bod kwam in eerdere hoofdstukken.
